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COLOUR, CLASS AND CUSTOM:
THE LITERATURE OF THE 1987 FIJI COUP
Rory Ewins
Preface
rhis paper is concerned with the dramatic events surrounding the 1987 coup in Fiji. In
his respect it is hardly unique: although the coup occurred only five years ago,
Hundreds of thousands of words have already been published concerning its possible
explanations. Rather than attempt to compete directly with those many books and
articles, I seek to explain the explanations by surveying the key works on the coup mat
were available up to late 1990, categorizing the major explanations they give for the
coup, and offering my own opinions as to which explanations are the most valuable.
Newer works on the coup will, ofcourse, present somewhatmoresophisticated
explanations than were offered in the months of confusion which immediately
followed May 1987. Readers of this paper should keep in mind the time during
which the works surveyed were written; some explanations given weight during
1987 and 1988 are held in considerably less esteem now. I certainly do not wish to
suggest that the writers discussed herein should be held to every word they wrote
three or four years ago; I imagine, though, that they would continue to defend the
broad thrust of their arguments, just as I defend those that I have given here.
Thanks are due to severalpeoplewho wereinvolvedinseeing thispaper through
to its present form: Richard Herr, who supervised the original honours dissertation
and suggested its publication; Trevor Sofield, for extensively discussing the coup
with me in late 1990; William Sutherland, for many helpful and interesting
discussions aboutthe 'politics of tradition'; Brij Lal and StephanieLawson, for their
specific advice about this paper and possible areas for its improvement; and Ron
May and Claire Smith for their editorial help. Finally, thank you to everyone in the
departments of Political Science, University of Tasmania, and Political and Social
Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University.
Rory Ewins
September 1992
Pronunciation
When the Roman alphabet was adapted to create a written-language version ofFijian,
some letters were made to represent consonant sounds quite different from their
English-language sounds:
b
c
d
J
g
q
is pronounced
is pronounced
is pronounced
is pronounced
is pronounced
is pronounced
mb
th
nd
ch
ng
ngg
as in 'number'
as in 'the'
as in 'lender'
as in 'choose'
as in 'singer'
as in 'finger'
Vowel sounds are pronounced as are Italian vowels. Thus:
Cakaudrove
Cakobau
Jale
Penaia Ganilau
Timoci Bavadra
Qiqiwaqa
is pronounced
is pronounced
is pronounced
is pronounced
is pronounced
Tha-kaun-dro-veh
Tha-kom-bau
Cha-leh
Pen-eye-a Nga-ni-lau
Tim-or-the Mba-vahn-dra
is pronounced Ngging-gi-wahng-ga
Abbreviations
In this paper the following abbreviations are sometimes used:
CIA Central Intelligence Agency of the United States
CRC Constitutional Review Committee
FLP Fiji Labour Party
FNP Fijian Nationalist Party
MHR Member of the House of Representatives
NFP National Federation Party
RFMF Royal (later Republic of) Fiji Military Forces
L THE COUP AND ITS EXPLANATIONS
ntraduction
sx ten o'clock on the morning of Thursday 14 May 1987, after only one month in
ower, the democratically elected government ofFiji was overthrown in a coupditat
onducted by the third-in-command of the Royal Fiji Military Forces, Lieutenant-
colonel Sitiveni Rabuka.
The morning session of Fiji's House of Representatives had, until then, been
[uiet enough. Alliance Party Fijian MP Taniela Veitata had been venting his
rustration at the defeat in the April elections of his party's government by the
-abour/National Federation Party Coalition:
Our chiefs are really the guardians of peace in Fiji [Mao] said that political
power comes out of the barrel of a gun. In Fiji, there is no gun. But our chiefs
are there; we respect them (quoted in Robie 1989:21 8).
Other races, though, Veitata said, had given the Alliance — the party of the
;hiefs and by implication of all indigenous Fijians — 'a kick in our faces' (quoted
n Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:69). 'Fiji belongs to the Fijians', he said, and
hen, referring to Fiji's other main racial group, 'in the same way . . . India belongs
o the Indians' (ibid.).
Veitata was interrupted by the entrance of ten masked soldiers, one of whom
gelled:
Sit down everybody Ladies and gentlemen, this is a military takeover. We
apologise for any inconvenience caused. . . . Stay cool, stay down and listen to
what we are going to tell you (Captain Isireli Dugu, quoted inRobie 1989:21 8).
Rabuka, dressed in a suit, had been watching from the public gallery. He stood
up, walked over to the Coalition's Fijian leader, Timoci Bavadra, and said, 'Mr.
Prime Minister, please lead your team down the right' (ibid.).
Bavadra looked around at his stunned colleagues, and at the 'immobile faces of
the Alliance Opposition seated across the chamber' (Bain 1989:3). 'Very well', he
replied, 'Under protest. Come along, gentlemen. Let us comply in a dignified and
correct manner' (quoted in ibid.). He and his fellow government MPs were led
outside at gunpointandordered into two waitingmilitary trucks . As theymovedoff,
Bavadra turned to Education Minister Tupeni Baba, another Fijian member of the
Labour Party, and asked: 'Is this really happening? A coup ditat in Fiji?' (quoted
in Robie 1989:219).
Thenews shocked a world grownblas6 about military takeovers. More than the
being the first to occur in the Pacific, Rabuka's bloodless coup had occurred in a
countrywhosesmooth transition to democratic self-rulehad been heldup as amodel
for theThird World. Australia andNewZealand expressedparticular alarm. Fij i was
thecrossroads ofaregion in which they considered themselves toplay a leadingrole.
Hurriedly-written analyses headlined 'Paradise Lost' and 'Trouble in Paradise'
appeared in major newspapers and magazines of the two countries. Television
stations matched stock film with spoken reports from a handful of correspondents.
Over the next few weeks the media patched together an explanation for Rabuka's
actions.
Thecoup,mostreports concluded,was theresultoflongstanding racial tensions
between indigenous Fijians and 'immigrant' Indians; Rabuka had acted on behalf
of his race. The print media ran potted histories of the Indian presence in Fiji and
describedtheLabour/NFP Coalitiongovernmentas 'Indian-dominated'. Subsequent
events were interpreted with race in mind: demonstrations staged by the militant
'TaukeiMovement' weretaken as signs of 'Fijian unrest'; Rabuka's second military
intervention in September 1987 was seen to be staged in response to acomeback by
the 'Indian' Coalition; an illegal arms shipment was seen as a sign of imminent
Indian revolt; and the most notable feature of the new constitution promulgated in
July 1990 was considered to be its creation of a parliament biased against Indians.
A campaign of harassment aimed mostly at Indians and conducted mainly by
the military1 and the Taukei Movement has reinforced this picture. Arson, looting,
andriots were all initially involved in this campaign, andformedpart ofa crime rate
which more than doubled in the months after May 1987 (Robertson and Tamanisau
1988: 122-23). On 15 October 1989, in a coordinated effort by a Methodist youth
group, four Indian temples in Lautoka werefirebombed,prompting a 24-hour strike
by Fiji's Indian community (The Australian, 1 6 October 1989; Fiji Times,! 8 Oc
tober 1989; The Age, 20 October 1989).
The forces of 'law and order ' have been equally at fault. In onebizarre incident
at a supermarket on 17 July 1987, a senior police official's wife complained of
discrimination whengiven a smallerplastic carrying bag than other shoppers. Police
quickly arrived and attempted to arrest the entire staff, eventually making do with
me overnight detention of three cashiers (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:124).
Reports continue, long after the coup, of arbitrary arrests, beatings, and intimida
tion. As recently as 24 October 1990, an Indian university lecturer was kidnapped
and tortured for taking pan in a public demonstration at which copies of the 1990
constitution were burned. Five soldiers were charged with the assault and pleaded
guilty (Paul Murphy, 'Dateline', SBS Television, 10 November 1990).
Mostmediacommentators continuetoseeintheseevents thesigns oflongstanding
racial antagonism. Others seemorecomplicated causes. Certain aspects ofthe coup
and subsequent events have prompted some observers, both in academia and
elsewhere, to search beyond race for more effective explanations. Suspicions were
first arousedwhen, the day after the coup,Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara2(prime minister
of Fiji from independence in 1970 until his defeat by the Coalition in 1 987) joined
Rabuka's Council of Ministers, a body dominated by Taukei Movement members.
This prompted speculation that the coup was the result of an Alliance plot. That
Rabukaquicklyyieldedpower to civilians, rather than maintainingpersonal control,
reinforced thebelief that he was acting on behalfofmorepowerful political players.
Certainly, events went remarkably smoothly for Rabuka. Initial problems,
which arose when the governor-general, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, condemned the
coup and refused to swear in Rabuka's Council, were more or less resolved within
aweek.By thenGanilauhaddismissed thereleasedBavadra government, dissolved
parliament, granted amnesty from prosecution to Rabuka and his men, and sworn
in a Council of Advisors almost all of whom met with Rabuka's approval. Since
then, most of the domestic obstacles faced by Fiji's various military-backed
governments havebeenovercome. The destruction ofdemocracy in what is now the
'Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji' seems complete.
Categorizing the explanations for the coup
Since 14 May 1987 many explanations for the coup have been advanced. These often
conflict with one another. Some are concerned mainly with one factor, such as conflict
between Fijians and Indians, while others offer a mixture offactors. In this paper the
various factors are grouped into four main categories: race, class, custom, and specific
interest.3 The rationale for this typology is outlined below.
There are several reasons for adopting such an approach. First, apart from a few
articles which review half a dozen major texts in less than a thousand words, little
attempt has been made to compare and contrast the major works on the coup.
Secondly, theexerciseofexaminingeach factor is valuablein itself, since it provides
a testofeachexplanationindividually.Finally.suchacategorization, by highlighting
the strengths and weaknesses ofthe mainexplanations for the coup, helps to isolate
the explanation with the greatest validity. The study also gives a measure of the
vulnerability ofliberal democratic institutions in Fiji, and an indicationofwhere Fiji
is heading in the 1990s.
Definitions
Before describing each factor, it is necessary to clarify the definitions of some of the
terms used in this paper. The labels used to describe Fiji's inhabitants have long been a
source of contention The label 'Fijians' was applied, from the earliest period of
European contact, to the race of indigenous people of Fiji, and since then indigenous
Fijians have opposed its extension to include other races. Therefore, inhabitants of
Indian descent, even if bom in Fiji, are generally known within Fiji as 'Indians' (and
were defined as such in its 1970 constitution). Other races are also labelled according
to their ancestry (Europeans, Chinese, and so on). The problem of finding a broadly
acceptable namefor all inhabitants ofFiji remains unsolved.
Some Fiji Indians, in an effort to more closely identify themselves with their
country, describe themselves as 'Indo-Fijians'. The term has been adoptedbymany
observers, although it is disliked by many Fijians and has connotations of racial
admixture which are inappropriate. Some observers even avoid 'Fijians' as a
description of the indigenous people, preferring the term 'Taukei', but in any
discussion of the coup, which inevitably will include references to the Taukei
Movement' , the use of 'Taukei ' as a broad label causes confusion and obscures the
divisions within the indigenous community.4
The more common terms 'Fijians', 'Indians', and (when referring to all
inhabitants of Fiji) 'Fiji citizens' are used hereinafter. Hence, it is the 'Fiji
government', not the 'Fijian government', and 'Fijian voters' refers only to
indigenous voters.
A less common label is used for Rabuka's reassertion of control on 25
September 1987, referred to by most observers as his 'second coup'. In this paper,
Rabuka's first military intervention of 14 May 1987 is called his 'coup', while his
second is called his 'second intervention'. This terminology was suggested by the
statements of two coup observers. One is William Tagupa, who says:
A military coup . . . often takes a long period of time to sweep aside the
institutional remnants of the previous government. In Fiji, I consider there to
have been a single coup, initiated on May 14 and not completed until Septem
ber 28 when the Republic of Fiji was unilaterally declared (Tagupa
1988: 144n).
The other is Sandra Tarte, who says:
This action by the military was not a second coup. The military clamp-down
that took place in September ... did not displace a legal government. There has
only been one coup, that of 14 May (Tarte 1987:75).
The use of the terms 'second coup' and 'the Fiji coups' suggests that one
considers the interim governments established after the 'first' coup to have been
legitimate (which I do not). It also obscures the differences between thetwoevents ,
and (in the context of 'explanations of the Fiji coups') implies that the same
explanation applies toboth,whichisnotnecessarily avalid implication. Events after
14 May whichhad been causedby thecoup in turn affected the events ofSeptember
and October. Furthermore, the motivations of key players evolved, and pro-coup
groups became more fragmented, throughout the months after the coup. But of
course, the explanations ofthe coupexamined inthis paper dogoa longway towards
explaining events since the coup.
A note must also be made about the use of the terms 'causes of the coup' and
'coup-makers '. Strictly speaking, the only people who canbe called 'coup-makers'
with certainty are Rabuka and the few soldiers who took part in his takeover. But
to follow this rigid definition is too limiting. Thus, the term 'coup-makers' is here
expanded to include those who had a hand in causing the coup and have demon
strated their support for it. Thesepeople may nothave helped plan the coup, but did
give active or tacit support before the event. A second group comprises those who
helpedtoensure thecoup'ssuccessaftertheevent(loosely termed 'coupsupporters').
A third comprises themembers ofFiji's public who approved ofthecoup. Together,
these three groups make up the pro-coup forces in Fiji. Obviously, disagreement
exists about who belongs in which category, and the terms are therefore somewhat
flexible.
Similarly, the only definite 'causes of the coup' are those which one can be
certain motivated Rabuka to act. Therefore they may, according to some accounts,
include only a distrust ofIndians and a concern for the future of the military. Again,
this term is expanded to include many of the forces at work in the events of 1987
(race, class, corruption, and so on). All have played a part in ensuring the success
of the coup, and all have been promoted by at least some observers as likely causes
of the coup.
Finally, while the pre-coup system of government defined by Fiji's 1970
constitution is often referred to as 'democratic', it must be noted that this was a
qualified form of democracy. Representation was defined along racial lines, and
minority groups other than Fijians and Indians were over-represented: while only
about 3 per cent of Fiji's voters were 'General Electors' (mostly Europeans, part-
Europeans, and Chinese), they elected 8 out of 52 (15 per cent) of the seats of the
House of Representatives. Worse electoral malapportionment has occurred in
Western 'democracies', however, and other symbols of democracy, such as free
domofthepress, werepresent inpre-coup Fiji (and arenoticably absent inpost-coup
Fiji). Certainly, the imperfect nature ofFiji's past system ofgovernment should not
be taken as justification for its present system. It is in part to avoid this implication
that I have retained the term 'democracy' as a description ofFiji's pre-coup form of
government.5
The racial explanation
As has been noted, race was the most commonly offered explanation for the coup in
the days immediately following 14 May 1987. Most media observers concluded that
racial antagonism between Fijians and Fiji Indians was sufficient explanation for
Rabuka's success in taking power.6 Rabukahimselfgave racial tensions as his primary
justification for staging the coup. In his early announcements, Rabuka declared he had
staged the coup for the paradoxical reason that racist elements within the indigenous
Fijian community (represented by the 'Taukei Movement') were causing unrest.7
Later, however, his personal concern about increased Indian powerwas put forward as
his real motive. Rabuka's interpretation of Fiji's race relations was further developed
in his own story of the coup, Rabuka: No Other Way (Dean and Ritova 1988)8, one of
the earliest books on the subject to appear. Foremost among Rabuka's fears — and
those of Fijians in general — was the perceived threat posed by Indians to Fijian-
owned land.
Deryck Scarr, an academic at the Australian National University and the author
of several books on Fiji's history, has given a primarily racial explanation for the
coup in his book Fiji: The Politics ofIllusion (Scarr 1988a). His main arguments,
well encapsulated by Barrie Macdonald (1990:201), are that 'beneath a facade of
racial harmony there were deep-seated tensions between Fijians and Indians, and
that the coup was made inevitable by a Fijian fear of dispossession once a
government with an Indian majority had been elected'. Some other observers, such
as Theo Roy, professor of Politics at University of Waikato, New Zealand, (Roy
1987, 1988) and Dalton West (1988) concur with this view.
Many observers, however, have viewed the race question from a different
perspective. Rather than giving race as the main factor involved in the coup, they
have given reasons why it was not the main factor. Brij Lal, a Fiji Indian academic,
examines the race question in detail. Although he says the importance of race
'cannot be. . .lightly dismissed' (Lal 1988a:7), Lal systematically argues that Fijian
fears about loss of land, for example, were unfounded, given the restrictions within
the 1970 constitution upon altering land-use legislation. Others, such as Stephanie
Lawson'andRobertRobertson and AkositaTamanisau(1988),10havemade similar
points.
Clearly, in the light of such literature, the validity of race as an explanation has
both divided, andbeen adominant issue amongst, coup observers. Race is undoubt
edly, therefore, a major factor of explanation. Hence its inclusion as a separate
category in this typology.
The class explanation
A second explanation for the coup deals with conflict between the working class and
the upper class in Fiji. Economic and social problems experienced by Fiji in the mid-
1980s, it is said, led to (primarily urban) working class dissatisfaction. This dissatis
faction prompted the formation in 1985 by Fiji's trade unions of the Fiji Labour Party.
Labour changed the face of local politics; unlike the Alliance and the National
Federation Party, it placed economic and labour problems squarely on the political
agenda, and thereby gained support among Indians and Fijians. When allied, through
the Coalition, with the NFP's Indian racial vote, this broadly-based support for Labour
defeated the 'upper class' Alliance, and threatened the Alliance's chances of ever
regaining power.
Theresult, accordingto this explanation, was anAlliancecampaignofdisruption
leading to the coup. The coup itself is seen as the upper class 's method ofregaining
the political and economic power which it had lost in the April 1 987 elections. This
explanation forms the basis of the analysis by Robertson and Tamanisau, whose
book, Fiji: ShatteredCoups (ibid.), is one of the major works in the literature ofthe
coup. Robertson andTamanisaumore or less equateFiji's 'chiefly bureaucracy' (to
use their label) with a Marxian conception of an upper class, and see Rabuka as
essentially the pawn of the 'ruling class'.
The class factor has been considered by other writers, both positively and
negatively. Someview thelanguage used in a class analysis as inappropriate within
the context of the coup. Scarr (1988a:35) denies Labour was or is a working class
party; he sees it as urban middle class, and calls it 'a front party for the National
Federation Party'. Lal, although giving class conflicts as part of a structural
explanation, does not examine this aspect of the coup in detail. Tagupa presents a
class picture of Fiji similar to that of Robertson and Tamanisau.
As will be shown, the class factor incompletely explains the motives of the
coup-makers. It remains important, however, as it provides the most commonly
used framework within which to discuss the rise of Labour, without which there
would have been no coup.
The custom explanation
Many indigenous Fijians hold the conviction that their community's past must be
reflected in the nation's present political system. At the simplest level, this is expressed
as a desire for Fijian political paramountcy, recalling days when Fijian interests were
paramount in all matters. This is the essence of the racial factor, and a simplistic
explanation gives this desire (purportedly heldby the majority ofFijians) as sufficient
cause for the coup.
The Fijian community's past is, however, reflected in Fiji's politics in more
concrete and complicated ways. Social and political divisions and structures from
thatpasthaveplayed arole inboth the day-to-day politics and thepolitical structures
of modern Fiji. These divisions and structures, having evolved from equivalents
existing in pre-colonial Fiji, are usually labelled 'traditional', although I have used
the label 'customary'."
Theview thatFijiancustomwashighly importantin ensuring thecoup 's success
has gained increasing support. Customary divisions within the Fijian community
are essentially oftwo forms, each to an extent overlapping the other. The first is the
'East/WestDivide':the 'Polynesian' easthashadtheupperhandoverthe 'Melanesian'
west in Fijian politics since Cession in 1874. The Coalition's championing of the
west, it has been said, gave eastern forces reason to wish it overthrown. A more
prominent source of division is the customary chiefly system. With the increasing
urbanization of Fijians, the chiefs have faced a threat to their political dominance
within both the Fijian community and Fiji. For the chiefs, the FLP (and hence the
Coalition) epitomizedthis threat. Ithasbeensuggested, inparticularby DavidRobie
(1987) that this prompted a chiefly conspiracy leading to the coups, with input by
Mara and Ganilau in their chiefly roles. At the least, it ensured the chiefly support
for the coup which was essential for its success.
The role ofcustom in the coup is discussed by many observers, although some
give itmoreweightthan others. Lawson,Lal, RobertsonandTamanisau, andRobert
Norton(1990)12 all discuss aspects ofthe custom explanation. Scarr, too, gives much
information which belongs in the custom category. Curiously, though, he places
little importance upon the divisions noted above. Scarr seems to view Fijians as a
homogeneous group, with a few minor exceptions of negligible importance.
The custom factor's importance stems from the widespread discussion of the
role in the coup of the chiefs and customary divisions. It also stems from the
reverenceshownby thecoup-makers forbodies such as the Great Council ofChiefs,
and the increasing role custom has played in shaping post-coup Fiji. The second
military intervention and the 1990 constitution, despite the superficial racial
10
character ofboth, lend weight to a custom explanation; indeed, they are difficult to
properly explain without one.
Explanations involving specific interests
The three factors ofrace, class, and custom provide systemic explanations for the Fiji
coup. They give evidence that the potential for a coup was part ofFiji 's society and its
political system. But explanations have also been given which centre on the motiva
tions ofspecific organizations and individuals, such as the Alliance Party, Rabuka, and
Mara. The factor of 'specific interest' is concerned with people and events unique to
the time and place of the coup. There are two sub-categories of specific interest: the
specific interests of individuals, such as Rabuka, Mara, and Ganilau; and the specific
interests of organizations, both internal and external to Fiji, such as the Alliance, the
military, and the CIA.
Lal'smainexplanationforthe coup is that it was largely the resultofthe ' actions
and motivations of specific individuals' (Lal 1988a:7). Lawson, andRobertson and
Tamanisau, have suggested thatindividuals withintheAllianceand thebureaucracy
may have been motivated to support the coup by a fear ofbeing exposed as corrupt
by the Bavadra government. Scarr, too, discusses corruption, although he treats it
more as the 'clumsy arrogance' of 'a party grown used to power' (Scarr 1988a:47).
Often the actions of individuals and groups can be explained in terms of the
categories previously given. An explanation based on personal interests overlaps,
to somedegree, race, class, andcustomexplanations. Mara and Ganilau, to take two
prominentexamples,havepersonal interests derivedfromclass andcustom interests.
Purely personal motivations, however, deserve separate attention, even if to
demonstrate that they can beexplained in terms ofother categories. The interests of
groups such as the Alliance and the military follow a similar pattern of partially
overlapping other categories.
Seemingly somewhat distinct is the possibility of Central Intelligence Agency
involvement in the coup. This possibility hasbeen raised in various places, butnone
of the major works give it much weight. The anti-nuclear policies of the Bavadra
government would obviously have beenunpopular with theUnited States, butmost
question the evidence ofUS involvement as being too circumstantial.
But even intervention by the CIA, with its hidden agenda for the region, sits
comfortably under the 'specific interest' heading. The common thread of all such
explanations is that the groups and individuals concerned acted in response to
personal circumstances, or to circumstances unique to Fiji in 1987. By implication,
they may have acted differently, or not acted at all, under different circumstances.
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The category of specific interest, then, is distinct from those of race, class and
custom; and, given the prominence of the people and groups concerned, it is a
category of major importance.
Assessing the utility ofeach factor
In order to establish which factor of explanation for the coup is the most useful, I have
looked at events other than those of May 1987. Where appropriate, I have considered
events leading up to the coup, their significance (including how they were regarded
before the coup took place), and their relevance to a particular factor of explanation.
Post-coup developments, such as Rabuka's second intervention, are examined in a
similar manner.
A factor's utility can also, in part, be assessed by examining how widely
accepted it is within coup literature, and comparing and contrasting the various
arguments given for and against that factor. A further consideration is how well a
factor can explain evidence given in support of other factors. The final test of its
importance is then straightforward. Two questions are asked: 'Was this factor
necessary to cause the coup?' and 'Was it sufficient cause for the coup?'
I conclude, after examining the four broad factors ofexplanation, that a custom
explanation provides the best framework within which to discuss the Fiji coup and
subsequent events. This is not to say that theotherfactors ofrace, class, and specific
interest are insignificant. I hope to show, however, that those factors are best
interpreted in terms ofthe motivations and impact ofthe Fijian community's chiefs.
For any exercise such as this, the study of a wide range of pre- and post-coup
literature is essential. It is only through such a broad study that the key issues of
importance in the coup, and their level of support among all observers, can be
discerned. I have limited my actual analysis to the explanations of a limited set of
key observers. 13 Itmustbe stressed,however, thatrepresentedamongtheseobservers
are most of the explanations given for the coup; indeed, this is one reason for
focusing on the particular observers chosen. All are prominent within Fiji coup
literature. While I have examined a wide range of smaller articles from journals,
newspapers, andmagazines, theyhaveusually beennotedonlywhen their arguments
are not covered by the key observers. The citation of articles and books by key
observers inpreference to smaller articles helps to define theexplanations ofthekey
observers. For similar reasons, secondary references (via the key observers) to
works written before the coup are sometimes more helpful in this context than
primary references.
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The coup and subsequent events have raised many questions about Fiji and its
future. Many of these, however, have limited relevance for a study ofexplanations
for the coup. Interestingpoints couldbemade about theinternational response to the
coup, the implications that the governor-general-led post-coup 'interim govern
ment' had for Westminster conventions world-wide, and the damage the coup
inflicted on the Fiji economy.14Where appropriate, comment on these areas will be
incorporated into this paper, but such comment will be limited. The far-reaching
implications ofRabuka's actions inevitably mean that the coup's causes are only a
small part of the Fiji coup story.
THE RACIAL EXPLANATION
In 1986, indigenous Fijians comprised only 46.2 per cent of Fiji's population of
700,000, compared with 48.6 per cent Indians (the remainder being Europeans,
Chinese, and other races).15Many among the Fijian community resent the 'immigrant
race', as Indians have been labelled,16 and periodically this resentment has risen to the
surface. Much of it is founded on half-truths and racial stereotypes, but it is enough to
have an effect on Fijians' perception of politics and the economy. Not surprisingly,
then, some observers' reaction to the coup was that it was a demonstration ofFijians'
resentment at being governed by an 'Indian-dominated' Coalition.
Racial stereotypes are a feature of Rabuka's narrated account of his coup, No
OtherWay(Dean and Ritova 1988). 'You can'ttell withlndians'.hesays, 'ifthey're
lying or not (ibid.\\20). Their basic failing, as he sees it, is that they are not
Christians. A strict Methodist (and lay preacher), Rabuka talks of the coup as 'a
mission thatGodhas givenme' (ibid. : 1 1 ). ToRabuka, Christianity is thefoundation
ofFiji. He sees the conversion ofIndian 'heathens' to Christianity as avalid solution
to racial problems (ibid.:\2\).
The Indian threat to Fijian culture is, in Rabuka's eyes, religious and political;
population and economic concerns do not seem to come into it. He is quite happy
for Indians to 'remain to make money' (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:102). In
fact, after it became obvious that many Indians were not staying after the coup, his
governmentadvertisedfor skilled Asianimmigrantsto take theirplace(PacificIslands
Monthly, March 1988, p.l5).Rabuka sees room for atleast 100,000 suchimmigrants
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(Dean and Ritova 1988:124), possiblyfrom Hong Kong (Robertson and Tamanisau
1988:102). Even at the simplest level of race, then, it is questionable whether
Rabuka's views would be shared by many Fijians.
Stereotypic views are held by both Fijians and Indians, as Lal describes:
The Indians frequently [see] Fijians as lazy and improvident, living for today
with little thought for the needs of tomorrow. The Fijians [regard] the Indians
as pushy and insensitive, perennially dissatisfied with their condition and
forever demanding a larger share of the cake (Lal 1988a:59).
Foremost among Fijian fears is that Indians are determined to break the Fijian
hold on land ownership. Fijian mataqali, or 'clans', own 82.16 per cent of land in
Fiji, and the crown owns 9.45 per cent (ibid.:24)" Indians work land leased from
the mataqali.
An explanation for these stereotypic views lies in Fiji's history. The Indian
presence in Fiji stems from the policies ofFiji 's first British governor after Cession
in 1 874, Sir Arthur Gordon. Gordonbelieved that 'nativeraces hadbeenshamefully
exploited in other parts of the British colonial empire' (Roy 1987a:5). To shelter
them from this exploitation, Gordon encouraged Fijians to 'live their traditional
lifestyle under the watchful care of their village chiefs' (ibid.).
Unfortunately, this precluded the use ofFijians as plantation labourers, without
which Fiji's colonial economy would have collapsed. A solution was found in the
example setbyother British colonies in Africaand the Carribean: Indian indentured
labourers. The first Indians arrived in 1879, and recruitment ceased only in 1916.
Approximately 40 per cent of the 60,000 Indian labourers brought to Fiji returned
to India after their indentures expired (Gillion 1962: 1 90). Those remaining formed
the basis of today's Fiji Indian population.
This influx was presented as a fait accompli to Fijians. To avoid possible
conflictwhichmight arisefromFijianresentmentofthisfact, the colonial government
physically separated the Indian and Fijian populations. Restrictions on areas of
Indian settlementwere in placeuntil the late 1 920s, andeven todaymostIndians live
in the westandnorthofFiji. Political representation for non-Europeans, when itwas
(gradually) introduced, was communal, with electors votingonlyforrepresentatives
of their own race. A similar system was carried on after independence.
Impediments to integration exist at all levels of society. In 1960 only 6 per cent
of schools were officially described as racially mixed (Norton 1977:27). Little has
changed since. Primary schools, where attitudes towards other races are made or
unmade for life, remained 'mostly racial' after independence (ibid.).
Interaction between races among the general population remains slight. The
majority of Fijians, over 60 per cent of whom still live in a rural or village
environment,18 would have little contact with the large numbers of Indian cane
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farmers, city dwellers or unemployed. Their contact with Indians is usually limited
to that with local small businessmen. As this is almost their only experience of the
world ofbusiness, arealm in which they feel at a distinct disadvantage, it reinforces
the 'Indian control of the economy' stereotype.
A partial explanation for Fijians' view of Indians as 'untrustworthy' has been
given by Roy. During World War II, in response to an imminent Japanese threat,
Fijians rushed to join the Royal Fiji Military Forces, secure in the knowledge that
'thecollectivenatureofFijian societyprovided adequatecarefor [their] dependants '
(Roy 1988:52n). Indians had no such safety-net, and 'were thus virtually bound to
their plots'. Unfortunately, their then-leader, A. D. Patel, obscured this 'quite
reasonable explanationoftheir failureto enlist' withanill-timeddirectiontoIndians
not tojoin up unless their pay was on the same scale as the British Army. This has
'ever since been regarded as evidence of [Indians'] disloyalty or even treachery'
(ibid.). Significantly, it also led to the RFMF becoming a Fijian preserve.
Roy is one adherent to the view that this long history of 'two human
communities...placed cheek-by-jowl in a situation of enforced collaboration'
( 1 987a:9) caused the coup. He notes other explanations, but says 'none seems to be
sustainable on any but themostflimsy circumstantial evidence' (ibid.).19The Indian
community, he says, 'sought control by manipulation of a constitutionally based
representative system and had the economic power to back its endeavors', while
Fijians, 'lacking such resources, fell back on the power of the gun' (ibid.).
Themostprominent academic argument in favour ofthe racial factor is Scarr's
Fiji: The Politics ofIllusion (1988a). Scarr's logic is basically that there are sig
nificant racial tensions within Fiji and that therefore the coup was inevitable. He
never convincingly demonstrates that one follows from the other; instead, he
attempts to place beyond all doubt that Indians and Fijians mistrust and dislike one
another. Todo this, he sometimes resorts to anecdotes (such as Fijian boysknocking
Indian boys down in school playgrounds) (ibid.:49) and personal observations of
day-to-day life in Fiji. His underlying message is spelled out in the book's
introduction:
To have watched and intermittently lived in Fiji for twenty-five years was to
knowhow amiable relations were between the two races on the surface But
it was also to know what private reservations were entertained, what active
dislike quietly revealed, what Fijian resentment existed, and how little really
intimate contact between Fijians and Indians occurred (ibid.:xiv).
Were Scarr (and, for that matter, Roy) discussing a mass uprising of Fijians
againstthe Coalition, his analysis wouldbe a telling one. Butthecoupwas the action
of a few, not of many, and it is not at all clear that the sections of the Fijian
community whose support ensured the coup's success represented all Fijians.
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Inhisquest to demonstrateFijians ' supportfor thecoup, Scarr examines therole
of the Taukei Movement, which was formed in response to (and in opposition to)
the Coalition's victory in April 1987. This supposedly popular movement has,
however, been discredited as such by other observers. Robie has revealed that
although not officially endorsed by the Alliance, the Movement contained Alliance
party members and politicians, as well as chiefs, Methodist clergy, police, and
members of the military (Robie 1987:12). And although it cloaked itself in anti-
Indian rhetoric, the Movement was, say Robertson and Tamanisau, essentially anti-
Coalition and pro-Alliance: 'Its leaders were mostly commoners on the fringes of
the Fijian establishment who saw the Coalition's election as dashing forever their
chances of patronage or power' (Robertson and Tamanisau Wf&Sty.20
Nevertheless, the Movement's anti-Indian rhetoric obscured its Alliance links
and won it supportfrom some easily-swayed Fijians: 'The Taukeist mixture of fact
and myth produced results in a nation where the level of communication is low'
(Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:103). Furthermore, theMovement 'drew upon the
Alliance's communal support for its own purposes. This enabled it to claim
substantial Fijian support' (ibid. : 1 00). The imageofpublic dissent manufacturedby
the Movement provided Rabuka with a pretext for launching his coup.
But despite increasingly frantic attempts by the Taukei Movement to stir up
trouble, opposition to the concept of a Coalition government had been on the wane
by early May 1987. PacificIslandsMonthly was ableto report that 'the"movement"
against the government has lost much of its appeal'. More significantly, it reported
that:
The new Government also won support from two prominent Fijian backed
political groups ... the WesternUnited Front headed by Ratu Osea Gadivi and
the Fijian Nationalist Party led by Mr Sakeasi Butadroka. They urged their
followers to accept the new Government because that was the choice of the
people (Pactfic Islands Monthly, June 1987, p.20).
Scarr himself has admitted that the Taukei Movement 'was in effect the
nationalist wing of the Alliance Party' (Scarr 1988a:62). This may at first seem to
contradict the thrust of his discussion of the Movement: that it was a strong sign of
Fijian discontentment with Bavadra's government. It does not, however, because
Scarr identifies the Alliance completely with Fijians, and vice versa. To Scarr, only
the Alliance truly represented Fijians. He regularly derides the small size of the
Coalition's Fijian vote (9.6 per cent, or, as he stresses, 'only 6 per cent of the total
voting strength'). He ignores thepoint that, as a sign of shifting Fijian attitudes, this
vote was highly significant. The figure of 9.6 per cent compared with a 0.8 per cent
Fijian vote for the NFP in 1982. Furthermore, the percentage ofFijians who turned
out to vote dropped from 85 in 1982 to 70 in 1987 (Lal 1988b:91). Many of those
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staying away would have been people who could not bring themselves to vote
Coalition but nevertheless wished to protest against the Alliance, a further sign that
not all Fijians identified with that party (ibid.).21
Mostobservers writing on the influence ofrace, other than Scan andRoy, argue
that race was not the most important factor in the coup. Those who so argue include
Robie,Lawson, and Kenneth Bain ( 1989).a Robertson and Tamanisau, inparticular,
go almost to the opposite extreme to Scarr. Race, they say, is 'the mostcomfortable
explanation for the coups. It neither challenges the intellect nor poses disturbing
questions' (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:144). Plentiful examples of 'racial
accommodation and harmony' existed before and after the coup, they claim, but
'made poorer copy than the stories of racial violence journalists expected and fed
upon' (ibid.:45).
Robertson and Tamanisau stress that the 'Coalition government was far from
being Indian dominated' (ibid.:\). The government was half Indian NFP and half
multiracial Labour; the prime minister and half his cabinet were Fijian, making the
cabinet the most evenly balanced, racially, that Fiji had seen. They also argue that
the dominant stereotype of Indians as 'rulers of Fiji 's economy' had little basis in
fact, citing aWorld Bank report which revealed that in 1977 Indian families earned
an average $4,003 per annum, while Fijian families earned $3,998— a difference
of only $5 a year (ibid.:32). In addition, of the 13 per cent of the population
unemployed in early 1987, Indians comprised two thirds. Besides, Robertson and
Tamanisau argue, 'if Fijians were marginalised, they were marginalised during
Fijian rule' (ibid.:\). For the Fijians' economic problems, 'Indians became the
scapegoat, despite the fact that trans-nationalbusinesses andnot Indians dominated
the country's major economic sectors' (ibid.:\4). The vast majority were 'working
class or cane farmers with incomes roughly equal to their Fijian counterparts'
(ibid.:\).
RobertsonandTamanisauacknowledge that irrational Fijianfears exist, quoting
oneTaukei Movementmember's claims that 'theIndians will rig the election so that
they will always stay inpower. They are averycleverand selfishpeople ' (jbid. : 100) .
But they balance these claimsby quotingmoremoderate Fijians, such as formerMP
Kolinio Qiqiwaqa: "The Indians here are our friends. . .they won't spoil anything'
(ibid.:\03). As for the Indians' views, they argue that
accommodation was as much a feature of Indian relations with Fijians in the
past as it was in 1987. This best explains why, immediately after the coup, a
kind of fatalism enveloped many Indians: they talked not of struggle, but of
emigration (ibid.: 102).
Ropate Qalo, in a 1984 study of local government in Fiji, similarly concluded
that Indians seemed to have been successfully convinced of the importance of
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maintaining the paramountcy of Fijian interests. He cited several examples of this
Indian 'accommodation', and quoted K.C. Ramrakha, a former Opposition Whip:
We Indians hope that the Fijian community will remain united and that we will
be able to deal effectively with a leader, or at the very most with a homoge
neous group of leaders ... if the chiefs go, or are divided, who will fill the
vacuum that mustensue? (quoted in Qalo 1984:51).
The relatively muted Indian response to the coup and events since seems to
support this picture. Karinvon Strokirchhas given various reasons for the 'low level
ofpopular protest and resistance [and] the lack of co-operation across racial lines
(von Strokirch 1987:37). Among these are lack of leadership for such a campaign
(with Coalition MPs initially detained after the coup), the 'combined effect of the
emergency regulations and a massive propaganda campaign on the part of the
Taukei and theRFMF\ andperhaps mostimportantly an 'overwhelming desire fa
return to normal life' (ibid.:37, 40, 39).
Beforeproceeding toomuchfurther, however, itshouldbe stressed thatracehas
proved important in Fiji's politics in the past. In the 1977 elections, to take a
prominent example, a strong showing by the extremist Fijian Nationalist Party split
the Fijian vote and lost the Alliance crucial national seats under the first-past-the
post electoral system.23 The NFP won 26 of the 52 seats in parliament, and was the
largest party in the House (the Alliance won 24). The governor-general, Ratu Sir
George Cakobau, did invite them to form a government, but then, ' in a period of45
minutes between the time he agreed to swear in the leader of the NFP and the time
the latter turned up for his appointment' changed his mind (Ghai and Cottrell
1990:175). He instead appointed Mara as prime minister, as the member who
appeared 'best able to command the support of the majority' (as the constitution
required). Certainly, the NFP was seriously divided at the time. But some have
hypothesised that the real reason for Cakobau's action was his fear ofFijian unrest;
many Fijians had already reacted to the election result with hostility (ibid.). Yasfi
Ghai and Jill Cottrell, however, have made the interesting point that:
One might equally argue that the Governor-General's behaviour in 1977
contributed to the sense that an Indian dominated government was unaccept
able, a sentiment that was to have such grave consequences ten years later
(ibid.).
Fiji citizens who followed their country's politics were constantly reminded of
the importance of race by political players who had a vested interest in keeping it
important. In 1977, Sakeasi Butadroka, leaderoftheminorityFNP,movedin the Fiji
parliament that all Indians be deported from Fiji. The motion was lost, but did not
go unnoticed by the public. A similar spectacle occurred in a 1982 meeting of the
72-member Great Council of Chiefs, which passed a motion urging that Fijians'
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majority in the House of Representatives be raised to two thirds (Islands Business,
December 1982, p.l 8). (As apointinmultiracialism'sfavour, however, this motion,
althoughpassed, 'couldn'tbeheld tobe themajorityview ofthe Council, sincemore
than 30 members abstained or were absent when votes were counted, and 15 votes
were cast against it' (ibid.). That this was so in the Council of Chiefs, the voice of
the Fijian aristocracy, is not insignificant.)
Mara himself was quite prepared to manipulate racial fears to guarantee Fijian
support for his Alliance Party, despite his regular rhetoric about 'multiracialism'.
When parliament defeated Butadroka's 1977 anti-Indian motion, Mara abstained
from voting. When the Great Council of Chiefs voted on their anti-Indian motion
in 1 982, Mara again abstained. In September 1986, with an election in the air, Mara
was warning a meeting that to vote for Labour would destroy Fijian paramountcy
(Pacific IslandsMonthly, November 1986, p.23). Until 1987 this policy of 'playing
the racial card', to use Robertson's and Tamanisau's term (1988:5), worked well,
consolidating Fijians' support for the Alliance.
At the heart ofFijians' fear of 'Indian domination' was a concern for their land.
Scarr, naturally, stresses the importance of this concern. Robie, although he is far
frombeinganadvocateofthe racial explanation, has noted that 'in traditional Fijian
political language, "land" also means "people": "The people are the land, the land
is the people", says a proverb' (Robie 1989:205).
Lal, although not dismissive of the importance of race in Fiji, has disputed
claims that Indians were ever a real threat to Fijian-owned land (Lal 1988a:chapter
1 ). Evenhad Indians wanted to take over Fijian land, he says, they would havebeen
unable to do so. Attempts by Indians to gainany sortofracial advantagewouldhave
been blocked by the upper house: 14 of the Senate's 22 members were nominated
by the leader of the opposition and the Great Council of Chiefs. Furthermore, any
attempt to change the clauses in the constitution which protected Fijian land rights
would need a three quarters majority vote in both houses to succeed. Indians alone,
with only 22 of the 52 seats in the House of Representatives, could not come
anywhere near that majority.
Norton, in a 1977 study, noted that the composition of the Senate was not a
ruling which had been forced upon Indians. The largely-Indian NFPhad played an
important role in setting up the 1970 constitution of Fiji. The NFP first suggested
that the Council ofChiefs bemadethebasis oftheupperhouse, with vetopowerover
'any legislation threatening the Fijians' land or institutions' (Norton 1977:134).
Scarr (1988a:22) has echoed post-coup Taukei Movement claims that these
safeguards could have been negated by the Crown Acquisition ofLandAct, which
permitted the compulsory acquisition of any land 'in such a manner as to promote
the public interest', a definition 'open to interpretationby the government'. But Lal
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(1988a:28) counters that this would need express Supreme Court authorization, and
only two of the Court's seven members were Indian.24
Then, of course, there is the fact that not all Coalition government members
were Indian. ThreeFijian Coalitionmembers crossing thefloor could defeatany bill
which changed land laws purely to Indians' advantage. In the circumstances, this
would have been a likely result. Labour wished to see a moreequitable distribution
among Fijians of land rents, but would not have looked favourably on an NFP 'land
grab' . TheCoalitionwasunited, butnotenough to withstand suchextremepressures
from within.
Such extreme-case scenarios assume a fierce determination by Indians to
dominate Fiji. But the NFP, and especially its leader in the 1970s and early 1980s,
SiddiqKoya, persistently denied therewere such aims (Norton 1977: 133). Although
some inevitably complained about land, most of the complaints arose from the
situation ofaneffectivemonopoly ofland lessors being able to raiserents somewhat
arbitrarily, and the insecurity arising from most leases being of ten years duration
rather than twenty or more.
Showing that Fijians' fears of Indians were largely unfounded, however, does
notprove that thosefears didnotexist. Regardless ofthe widespreadpoverty among
Indians, prosperous Gujerati businessmen were all too visible to Fijians. Neither
was the Constitution a comfort to most. Prior to the coup,no Fijian translation ofthe
document existed. Fewknew the extent of its protection for Fijian land rights. Even
then, constitutional safeguards, as Scarr points out, were not the point to some
Fijians: 'It was the lewa, the rule, that counted' (Scarr 1988a:62).
Scarr ends his book with supposedly incontrovertible evidence in favour ofhis
racial argument. On 31 May 1988, twelve tonnes of arms were discovered in a
container in Sydney.boundforLautoka. Themiddlemanfor the arms shipments was
identified as 'reputed well-known Fiji-born criminal, MohammedRasic [sic: Rafiq]
Kahan', who quickly fled to the UK (ibid.: 147). Scarr repeats the allegations made
by themilitary-backed government that the arms were intended foruseby Coalition
supporters, and concludes:
The object ofthis gun-running seems clear: massive bloodletting. The prepara
tions for civil war should at least have shown Fijians that the Indian community
was not as supine as too many Fijians assumed (ibid. : 149).
Fiji's military and police detained43 suspects in raids, and eventually charged
21 with arms offences. Three former Coalition ministers were arrested and later
released withoutcharge. Rabuka then introduced the retrospectiveInternal Security
Decree, which allowed for the detainmentofanybody suspected of ' subversion' for
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up to two years without charge, with an indefinite number of two-year extensions
possible (Robie 1989:249-50).
Serious doubt has been cast on claims that the arms smuggling was Coalition-
backed. Robie (1989:250) notes Kahan's 'close ties with several leading Alliance
politicians, including Apisai Tora, Taniela Veitata and Ahmed Ali\ all of whom
have been prominent members of post-coup regimes.25 More significant is the
scenario outlined by Christopher Harder.26 Harder's account ofevents indicates the
involvementofelements ofthepost-coupgovernmentin the affair, and suggests that
it was the result of a behind-the-scenes power struggle between Rabuka and Mara,
each of whom feared that the increasing power of the other would make himself
redundant.27 This scenario hasbeenpublicly supported by Butadroka, who 'charged
the pro-Mara faction in association with the Alliance Party and Muslims with
responsibility for the smuggling' (Robertson and Tamanisau 1989:227).
Even if the claim of Coalition-backing for the arms shipments is accepted, it
lends only limited support to the racial explanation of the coup, as do most of the
examples of racial conflict which have occurred since May 1987. Most of this
conflict was causedby the coup, not a causeofthecoup. Thecouphas sentFiji down
a path whereracism is accentuated and encouraged by those in power, to the extent
that Rabuka publicly praises South Africa's system of apartheid (Government of
India 1989:18; Robie 1989:251). Theracism seennow is far more extreme than any
seen in the years immediately before 1987.
Whatconclusions canbedrawnfrom this study ofthe arguments for and against
the race factor? The first is that it should not be dismissed out of hand as being
unimportant to Fiji's politics. The second is that it should not be embraced as the
primary explanation for the coup. I would suggest a more integrative explanation:
race was an important consideration for the elements of the Fijian community who
werebehind thecoup, andprovidedthemwith a powerful rhetorical weapon, but the
coup was not caused, as some suggest, by a near-unanimous Fijian antipathy
towards Indians.
The Bavadra government's Indian associations did affect it in the eyes of the
Fijian public. The surprise, if not shock, at this dramatic turnaround in Fiji politics
must have been profound. But most Fijians were, before the coup, prepared to give
the Coalition a chance to govern. To some Fijians, however, its perceived Indian
domination was one of a number ofconcerns which caused them to seek its demise.
Those Fijians were the chiefs and the staunch supporters of the chiefly system.
Lal gives a clue which points to this explanation. After discussing historical
examples of anti-Indian sentiments expressed by Fijians, he puts them into context
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by noting that 'we are, for the most part, listening to the words of chiefs and
particularly the traditionalist eastern maritime chiefs with little or no experience of
multiracialism' (Lal 1988a:63).
It was the chiefs, in fact, who had the most to lose by any increase in Indian
power, and the chiefs and their supporters who, as a result, harboured some of the
most anti-Indian sentiments. But, as will be shown later, the chiefs wereoutoftouch
with Fijian society. Theirextremism was not sharedbymanyFijians. Thepost-coup
regime seems to have been genuinely surprised to learn this:
The military noted the growth in the forces of opposition and were worried.
They expected Indian opposition, but not dissent from among Fijians
(Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:125).
The armyhadmade the samemistake as Scarr: theyhad assumed that the Fijian
community was homogeneous, and was behind them all the way.
Race did,however, provide arhetoricaljustificationfor thecoup. It provided the
coup-makers with legitimacy in the eyes of many politically naive commoner
Fijians. Such Fijians were prepared to put aside any pre-coup grievances against
chiefs and theAlliance in thefaceofthe serious threat theyhadbeen hearingsomuch
about. Much of this 'threat' stemmed from blatantly false allegations made by
Rabuka's regime with the intention of discrediting the Coalition. Before the coup
these allegations were made by the Taukei Movement; afterwards they were made
bythemilitary andothers inpower, and appeared in the Fij iannewspaperNaiLalakai
andtheFijianprogrammeofRadioFiji rather than theirEnglish-languagecounterparts
(ibid.). The fear they provoked tapped into a reservoir ofFijian disquiet concerning
Indians, and thus prevented a large Fijian backlash against the overthrow of the
respected institutions of government and law.
The tragedy of the coup's reinforcement of racism is that seventeen years of
independence and 'multiracialism' had, until then, been steadily changing Fijian
attitudes. The emergence of Labour, a genuinely multiracial party (a fact which
many more familiar with the older Fiji refuse to accept), was merely the first sign
ofthis change. Amongyoung (and particularlyyoungurban) Fijians, multiracialism
wasmorethanrhetoric, it was thewayoflife in Fij i. A signofthis was apost-election
and pre-coup poll of Fijians, which showed that supporters of the Coalition
government comprised 80 percent of those aged between 16 and 30 years, and 45
per cent of those between 3 1 and 35 (ibid. 1988:66).a Significantly, however, older
Fijians did not support the Coalition at all. It canbe argued, then, that in another ten
years Rabuka's coupwouldnothavesucceeded; it wouldhavefacednot only Indian
opposition butoppositionfrom a clearmajority ofFijians. As it was, itreceived tacit
support from an unclear majority. This suited the coup-makers well, for, as the
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following chapters show, they hadmany other goals they wished to see achievedby
the coup.
•3 THE CLASS EXPLANATION
A class-based explanation for the coup lies at the heart of Robertson's and
Tamanisau's major analysis. Their book Fiji: ShatteredCoups (1988) is the most de
tailed yet published about the coup, and their preferred explanation deserves close
attention. It is an explanation accessible to Western observers, as it concentrates on
aspects of Fiji politics parallel to the central concerns of Western systems: the
economy and the labour movement. While other observers address issues raised by
Robertson and Tamanisau to a greater or lesser degree, they tend to do so from a
different perspective. Thefocus on class seems to bemostdevelopedby Robertson and
Tamanisau.
Robertson's and Tamanisau's thesis is that 'class forces' caused the coup, and
that the main such force which ensured its success was the 'chiefly-bureaucratic
class'. Robertson has since stated:
Bavadra and his Coalition government were thwarted by a small handful of
malcontents, allied with the military and able to exploit indigenous discontent
to their own selfish ends.. . . Rabuka launched his first coup in order to preserve
the integrity of Fiji's ruling class, threatened, he believed, by the election of a
new Coalition government (Robertson 1990: 1 16-17).
In Shattered Coups, however, it is left largely to the reader to disentangle the
thrust of Robertson's and Tamanisau's argument from the mass of detail they
present. Their analysis depends heavily oncharting the riseofLabour, a multi-racial
working- and middle-class party, in the years immediately preceding the coup.
Various conspiracy theories surrounding the coup are then discussed, noneofwhich
the authors embracewholeheartedly, and events in Fiji through toRabuka's second
intervention are described. The reader is left to infer, from the discussion ofLabour
and from the Marxian language used throughout the book, that upper class forces
brought about Bavadra's downfall.
Thevehicle of these upper class forces, say Robertson and Tamanisau, was the
Alliance Party. In the mid-1980s, the Alliance seemed to have an unbreakable grip
on power. It had been the governing party in Fiji since independence, had looked
after the interests of Fiji's 'ruling class' of chiefs, wealthy Indians and Europeans,
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and hadbeen rewarded with unwavering Fijian support. As long as this support was
solid, and afew wealthy Indians and general electors voted along conservative lines
the 1970 constitution's electoral set-up guaranteed the Alliance power.
But the Alliance was more than a Fijian party: it was a class-based conservative
party whichhaddone little to address the concerns ofFiji 's workers. Therehad bee-
no need, as the workers had been mostly Indian, and Indian workers did not vote
Alliance. By 1987, however, Fijians also had reason to complain, as Robertson and
Tamanisaudemonstratebydetailing the Alliance's neglect oftheeconomy. In 1982
1 8 per cent of the country's households — over half of these Fijian—were livin.
beneath the poverty line. Unemploymenthadreached 1 3 per cent, a largeproporti c:
being young people. In 1986 one in every eight Suva residents lived in a squatte
colony. Withnowelfare system, thoseFijians outside thevillage supportsystemfell
the affects of these problems acutely (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988).
Poverty had led to increased crime, with a doubling of rape offences between
1985 and 1986, and a 37 per cent increase in burglaries and break-ins. The Alliance
response was to support the establishment of Neighbourhood Watch schemes. In
1985, 72 per cent ofprisoners were Fijians (ibid. :30-3 1 ). Until the formation of the
Labour Party, these issues had received little attention. The NFP, itself more
business-oriented than working class, was seen as little help: 'There was no voice
in the Parliament to raise the kind of issues which concerned the union movement'
(ibid.:22).
Tofill this vacuum, the Fiji TradeUnionCouncillaunched the Fiji Labour Parry
on6 July 1985. Atfirst, Labour's objectivewas amodestone: to win powerby 1997
But a string of local council election successes revealed a strong reservoir of
community support, and in the process pointed to dangers: by splitting the non-
Alliance vote between FLP and NFP under the first-past-the-post system, Labour
could guarantee a landslide Alliance victory in the 1987 elections (ibid.:36).
Initially Labour rejected the solution of a coalition with the NFP; in June 1986
Bavadra referred to a possible coalition as 'an alliance that could never work'
(Islands Business June 1986, p.21 ). But after months of discussions within the FLP
and between the two parties a coalition was accepted, not only as a means of
unseating the Alliance, but also as protection against the devastating effects of an
Alliance landslide win. Ideological differences between both sides, however,
remained (Pacific Islands Monthly February 1987, p.19).29
Inthemonths before theelection,Labourconfronted thepublic.bothFijians and
Indians, with problems which had never been addressed and opinions which had
never been properly aired:
Like a true opposition party, it focused on issues that were of immediate
concern to the nation's people. If the Alliance reacted with hostility, it was
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largely because it was unused to facing an alert and assertive opposition
(Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:39).
Labour rejected the conventional 'blame the Indians' explanations for Fiji's
poor economic performance: it laid the blame squarely at the feet of the Alliance.
The FLP was not challenging Fijians, as it needed their votes to win. But 'it did
challenge the Alliance's claim to be the sole representative of Fijians' (ibid.:6). In
October 1986, Timoci Bavadra claimed that:
The bulk ofthe population has been disappointed. There is greater migration....
Unemployment is high, crime is increasing, mismanagement of government
money is seen in every department. There is a strong feeling ofdisillusionment
and disenchantment with thepresentgovernment (Pacific Islands Monthly, No
vember 1986, p.22).
On such sensitive issues as land rights, Labour stressed its commitment to
protecting the interests of the common Fijian: 'Labour did not question land
ownership, only its class control' (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:48). It exposed
cases of Alliance government neglect of these same Fijian interests, outlining, for
example, 'how Nasomo land at Tuvatuva was given to the Emperor Gold Mining
Company without considerationofrentals or compensation for theNasomopeople'
(ibid.).
Labour's policies attracted thoseFijians whohad left the village system andfelt
left out. Some were rural workers, but most were young, educated, and primarily
urban, a section of Fijian society increasing in numbers (by 1986, 38.9 per cent of
Fijians lived in urban areas — Lal 1988a:49). When allied with Indian Coalition
supporters, they toppled the Alliance; the 'racial card' which had kept the Alliance
in power for seventeen years had been lost. Fijian support for the FLP was enough
tokeepthe Alliance defeatedforsome time. TheFLP, then, concludeRobertson and
Tamanisau (1988: 14), 'represented the most complete challenge to the position of
the chiefly bureaucratic class in the 20th century'. One could add that its particular
threat was its potential as a continuing challenge to the chiefly class, as opposed to
the sporadic challenges seen previously.
Robertson and Tamanisau expand their class picture of Fiji by adding to it the
reactions of pro-Coalition forces after the coup. Under the sub-heading 'Confront
ing Class Forces ', theydiscuss themostprominentprotest against Rabuka's regime:
the cane-cutting strike. The sugar industry is vital to Fiji's economy, andmost ofits
48,000 employees are Indians. Cutting and crushing for 1987 should havebegunon
19 May, but 'by mid-June the cane was still in the fields and flowering' (ibid.:\ 19).
But the cane-cutting strike was not a particularly strong example of the
multiracial class forces which, Robertson and Tamanisau stress, the FLP helped
unleash. It began as a response by a sizeable part of the Indian community to
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Rabuka's racial rhetoric. It seemed to many Indians that thecoup was aimed at them
alone. Cane farmers, therefore, resented pressure from the interim government:
"They are asking us virtually to give up our political rights and in the same breath
they are asking our sugar farmers to save the country's economy' (ibid.).
Neither could the strike be seen as a wholly political action. Farmers 'differed
widely in their reasons for refusing to harvest' (ibid.:\20). Many were trying to
bargain for economic security. A set of farmers' demands made on 10 June was
economic in nature, and includedpayment ofthe full forecast price forcaneplus the
cancellation ofsome old debts. The Fiji Sugar Company finally called the farmers '
bluff by closing its mills for one month. Pro-harvest factions among the strikers
gained in numbers, and by mid-July cutting had begun.
Tagupa's (1988) study ofthe coup, althoughmuchshorter thanRobertson's and
Tamanisau's.has someparallel themes. Hespends considerable timeexamining the
'politicization of class' in Fiji. Tagupa defines class as 'a social and economic
category that results when agroup feels and articulates that its commoninterests are
different from, if not opposed to, those of others' (Robertson and Tamanisau
1988: 1 3 1 ). Class is useful, hesays (quotingWilliamReddy) as a tool for ' analyzing
the social structure of societies in which "money and monetary exchange are the
principal determinants ofone's social position"'. He states that 'the 1987 elections
were anunequivocal expression ofincreasing class development in Fiji ' . The coup,
in Tagupa's opinion, was the result of conflict and interaction between 'the
traditional taukei elites and their nontraditional and neotraditional counterparts'
(ibid.:\33).
Among other observers, Lal (1988a) also notes 'class conflict' as a factor in the
coup, but does Utile in Power and Prejudice to follow this line of inquiry. Indeed,
the elements which Robertson and Tamanisau treat in greatest depth — Fiji's
economy in the 1980s, and therise ofLabourand the Coalition—are almost ignored
in Lal 'shook.30Lai did discuss the sameissues ina 1986 study oftheFLP (Lal 1986),
and probably did not think it necessary to repeat the information. By not doing so,
though, he misses the opportunity to explain exactly how class conflict motivated
the coup-makers.
The most prominent attack upon the class picture of Fiji has come from Scarr,
who disputes Labour's 'working class' credentials. He characterizes the FLP as 'a
middle-classurban-based, salaried-people's party, mildly left-wing (Scarr 1988a:34),
and dismisses it as 'a front party for the National Federation Party' (ibid.:35). His
evidence for the latter (the defection of many NFP members to Labour) ignores
Labour's origins and early history. With the former claim, however, Scarr has a
point, as he does when questioning where the funding for the Coalition's many
election promises would have come from. Neither point, however, invalidates
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Robertson's and Tamanisau's claim that Labour was seen as a threat by the ruling
class.
At times it seems Robertson and Tamanisau are attempting to give weight to
their class-based analysis merely by using appropriate language: for example, the
ruling class, they say, was ' a coalitionofdisparate class fractions (theFijian chiefly-
bureacratic class, and Indian, European, and metropolitan bourgeoisies)' (Robertson
and Tamanisau 1989:21 8). Their study of the forces opposed to Labour focuses on
the 'chiefly-bureaucratic class ' . Thismakes their dismissal ofthe 'tribal conspiracy
theories' surrounding the coup seem somewhat incongruous. They see the coup-
makers' allegiences as 'political, not tribal; their motivation therestoration ofFijian
ruling class authority' (Robertson and Tamansiau 1988:98-99). But when the main
feature ofthatruling class is its 'chiefly' element, it is difficultto seehowan analysis
focusing on chiefly institutions is less adequate than a class-based analysis. A
similar objection can be made to Tagupa's 'traditional elites versus nontraditional
counterparts' language.
Theremay be, nonetheless, plausible reasons for using a class analysis. Such an
analysis accounts for the members of Fiji's elite who do not fit the 'chiefly' label.
Prominent Europeans and Indian businessmen have no chiefly status; neither do
educated commonerFijians. Butmembers ofthese non-chiefly groups haveplayed
key roles in Fiji's politics before, during, and after the coup.
A closer examination ofthe nature oftheir roles, however, reveals that they are
less influential than their supposed 'ruling class' status would suggest. In economic
terms, there is no doubt that many Europeans and Indians are successful capitalists
and hence 'upper class'; commoner Fijians rising to the upper echelons of the civil
service may also warrant this label. But in political terms, they are largely
subservient to the chiefs. Their political power extends only to the limits set by the
chiefly elite.
A telling example is provided by the pre-coup political institution of the
Alliance's Indian Association. The Alliance had established Indian and General
Electors ' Associations as evidence of its multiracialism. Thebulk of its support was
Fijian, though, and thelesser Associations neverenjoyed equal status with theFijian
Association. Given that some Indian and general elector support was necessary for
the Alliance to win a parliamentary majority, one would have expected the lesser
Associations to command considerable leverage within the Alliance. But the
leverage worked the other way, if anything, and the Indian Association, consisting
ofGujerati businessmen and minority Muslims,could often do littlemorethanvoice
its protest against government excesses.
TheIndian Association 's powerlessness was particularly obvious attimeswhen
the government was 'playing its racial card', and at no time more so than after the
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1987 elections. At a meeting held on the Easter weekend, the Fijian Association
incensed at an 'Indian' victory, proposed to march to the governor-general and
demand constitutional changes. Calls for Mara to 'show respect for Indians in the
Alliance' by condemning the proposal met with silence. As events unfolded
'members of the Indian Alliance watched with horror as the multiracialism of their
party was rapidly stripped before their own eyes' (ibid. :64-66). The real extent of
their influence was made painfully clear.
Perhaps a stronger point in favour ofa class analysis is that it provides a suitable
frameworkwithinwhichto discuss the deteriorating Fiji economyoftheearly 1980s
and the resulting rise of the FLP. Without the latter mere would almost certainly
have been no defeat of the Alliance in 1987, and therefore, of course, no coup. But
Robertson's and Tamanisau's focus on the FLP (which is their book's strength)
raises a critical questionabouttheclass analysis: it admirablyexplains thebackground
and motivations of the losers in the coup, but does it explain the motivations of the
winners?
Robertson and Tamanisau's thesis is that the coup was thereaction ofthe ruling
class to events which promised to deprive it of political and economic power. Cast
in these terms, it appears equivalent to any upper class, anywhere in the world,
repressing the lower classes to maintain its own wealth and privilege. But such a
picture of Fijian society carries false implications. It implies that the 'chiefly-
bureaucratic fraction' of the ruling class was maintaining its 'chiefly' status as
merely a front to keep the commoners happy while it consolidated its fortune. It is
much more likely that the chiefs, if they thought about it at all, considered their
personal wealth to be a happy fringe benefit of chiefly status; moreover, it must be
remembered that far from all chiefs are wealthy, and few personally wield great
political power.
Bavadra and the FLP believed that Fiji's politics had come of age, and that the
time was right to address questions of economic imbalance and workers' rights.
Many Fijians and Indians agreed; the coup-makers did not. Those evicted from
power by the coup, and those staging the coup, lived in different worlds. Bavadra's
government reflected its educated and modern origins in its class-based analysis of
Fiji's problems and in its welfare-state solutions. To the Coalition's Indian mem
bers, the chiefly system was meaningless, while to its Fijians, the system was a
symbol but little more. To the coup-makers, however, the chiefly system was a
major part of their world-view. Any chiefs among them — even (and perhaps
especially) those from the highest levels — carried with them a lifetime of
inculcation of the importance of the system of which they were a part. Members of
the 'chiefly bureaucratic class' would have the chiefly system uppermost in their
minds.
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How, thai, could they accept a Labour view of Fiji? Labour's class model
implicitly rejected their chiefly model as anachronistic. To allow suchviews to gain
popular (Fijian) acceptance would be to undermine their entire position. Even if,
then, the coup-makers can be labelled in class terms, their motivations were more
thanthoseof 'protecting wealth andpolitical power' ; in part, they were rejecting the
very model of class itself.
Part of the despair the coup provoked in many observers was caused by its
implications of 'turning the clock back'. Many Fijians had been on the verge of
embracing a modem (non-racial) 'working class versus propertied class' view of
Fijian politics; thecoupreversed this trend, and consolidated an archaic 'hereditary
chiefs ruling commoners' view among Fijians.
The class analysis of the coup, at least as offered to date,31 uses the wrong
language to describe the motivations of the coup-makers. Indeed, it suggests
strongly that a custom analysis is a more fruitful line of inquiry.
THE CUSTOM EXPLANATION
The roots of the custom explanation for the coup reach back to Fiji's earliest recorded
history.32 Pre-cdonial Fiji, a melting pot of ancestral Polynesian, Melanesian,
and Western Polynesian influences, had a strong tradition of chiefly rule. Differ
ences existed between the methods of social organization of western and eastern Fiji:
the chiefly hierarchy was especially well-developed and entrenched in the essentially
Polynesian society of the east, less so in the more Melanesian west. By the nineteenth
century, warfare was virtually continuous and the dominance of one group over
another was only ever temporary.
The act of ceding Fiji to Britain in 1874 was a desperate attempt by one high
chief, Ratu Seru Cakobau, to maintain power. Cakobau had made his base in Bau
the most powerful confederation in Fiji, but this was at risk from various quarters.
Important among these threats was that from the Tongan chiefMa'afu, based in the
islands of Lau, who had formed an alliance (the 'Tovata') with the chiefs of
Cakaudrove (Northeastern Fiji), and was posing a challenge to Cakobau's pre
eminence. Cakobau's gamble paid off. The presence of the British halted these
grand power struggles.
Cession had two dramatic effects on traditional Fijian society. The first was to
freeze the power straggle at its 1874 'state of play', with Bau pre-eminent. The
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Tovata, which may otherwise have soon gained the upper hand, was forced to
acquiesce to cession, and the west was taken to be of little importance. The Bauan
dialect became the national form of the Fijian language. Bauan, Cakaudrove and
Lauan chiefs formed the hub of the colonial Fijian aristocracy. In some cases, areas
of Fiji which had only recently been defeated in battle by another area were
permanently recorded by the British as being 'vassals' to their (otherwise tempo
rary) conquerors. Finally, 'Fijian lands, or whatwas left ofthem after the chiefs had
enthusiastically sold those of their enemies' (Routledge 1985:21 8),33 were decreed
by the colonial administration to be inalienable.
The second effect of Cession was the restructuring of the chiefly system itself.
Governor Gordon wished to retain chiefly paramountcy, mainly for romantic
reasons noted previously, but also because Britain was concerned with administer
ing the colony as cheaply as possible. By introducing a system of 'indirect rule'
through the chiefs, the British simplified the task ofcontrolling the Fijianpopulation
(Roth 1951).
The old system of chief-selection was, however, no longer viable. Previously,
a chief, thoughnoblebybirth, often gained elevated authority throughviolence, and
if he proved a poor chief, lost it through violence, either at the hands of his own
people or at the hands of a conquering army. The British might have avoided many
problems had they introduced some form of 'negotiated' selection of chiefs. But
instead they adopted the system they knew best, that of heredity. After the 1870s,
a chief came from his region's 'chiefly family', the title essentially passing to his
eldest son. Unless things went very wrong, he held the title for life.
TheBritishhadcreatedFiji'sown 'aristocracy'—agroupoffamilies thrust into
high positions and kept there by virtue of lineage. With the passage of time, these
families intermarried and consolidated their position.34 They increasingly came to
identify their own interests with those of the nation, at the same time as those
interests were in fact gradually diverging.
As the twentieth century progressed, the chiefs, and in particular the eastern
chiefs, developed a community of interests with Fiji's European population. They
experienced only a few minor challenges to their pre-eminence among Fijians, and
these were all overcome. Thus, in 1970, the chiefs, through the Alliance Party,
inherited the reins of government of the newly independent Fiji, under a system
designed to guarantee them power through an electoral coalition of Fijians and
Europeans.33 As wasdiscussedpreviously, thechiefs formedtheheartofindependent
Fiji's ruling class, and in fact were its most distinguishing feature.
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Chiefly dominance andpower
The importance of the chiefs and therefore ofcustom in Fiji 's politics has been
stressed by many observers, and many link it directly to the coup. Foremost among
those who do are Lawson and Norton, but information relevant to this explanation
canbefound in works byRobertson and Tamanisau, Lal, Bain, AnthonyvanFossen
(1987), as well as others. Custom was, however, largely neglected by journalists at
the time of the coup. A notable exception was Robie, who wrote in July 1987:
It is the changing attitudes among indigenous Fijians that the chiefly aristoc
racy fear as the primary threat to their power and authority, not the Indians
(Robie 1987:12).
The chiefs' dominant position among Fijians was coming under threat, and in
the mid-1980s these threats were epitomized by Labour. Lawson has succinctly
stated the problem for the chiefs which then arose:
The coalition under Bavadra's leadership sought to break down the constraints
mat had been imposed on political discourse by the perpetuation of the plural
society syndrome and to draw attention to a community of interests between
ordinary Fijians and Fiji Indians. This constituted a major threat to the founda
tions on which chiefly power in the modem sphere of democratic politics was
dependent (Lawson [Hagan] 1988a:l).
For most of the century of colonial rule the overwhelming majority of Fijians
remained loyal to their chiefs. The absolutist nature of chiefly rule, says Lawson,
was 'reinforced on theone hand by the early policy of indirect rule based on eastern
structures and requiring a strong chiefly system and, on the other, by lingering
superstitiousfears'(i6id.:14). Fijians had limitedopportunity to escape this system:
even into the 1950s, Fijians settling in towns 'could by law be returned to their
villages' (Bain 1989:14). In 1956, 73 per cent ofFijians still lived in villages, with
another 16 per cent in rural areas, and those who lived outside villages (in breach
ofregulations) maintained theircustomary links (Ward 1987 :35). Butby 1976, only
half of all Fijians lived in villages. The other half found links based on village
activities harder to maintain, and thechiefs' presencebecameless easily felt. Fijians
were gradually reducing the importance of the chiefly system in their lives.
Some who still lived in villages were also becoming disillusioned. According
to custom, the chiefly post carried with itmany responsibilities for looking after the
village. With increasing governmental administration, this role waned, and some
chiefs even became 'absentee nobles', living in Suva or other centres. With chiefly
selection largely hereditary, chiefs became less accountable to their villagers, and
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some neglected their responsibilities. Rata Sir Penaia Ganilau noted this problem
in 1982:
[If the chief] neglects his own chiefly obligations, his power begins to wane. He
won't be able to get things done, and thatunfortunately is what is happening in
some places today (quoted in Keith-Reid 1982: 1 5).
Ganilau agreed that 'some commoners were questioning chiefs in a way that
hadn't been customary before' (ibid.:\6). Allegations of official corruption which
arose in the mid- 1980s (see section 5, this paper) did nothing to ease this problem.
As was discussed earlier (see pp.13, 19-20), the perceived Indian threat to
Fijian-owned land was of concern to many Fijians. But problems arising from
chiefly management of that land also contributed to discontent within the Fijian
community. Nearly a quarter of all rent for Fijian land goes directly to the chiefs.
Gerard Ward, in a pre-coup study, recorded that:
If the mutual obligations . . . were observed, much ofthis 22.5% might beused
for the common good... Often it is not. Rents from communal land havemade
some individuals very wealthy (Ward 1987:43).
Robertson and Tamanisau note a further problem with land ownership, raised
by Labour's Krishna Datt in 1986:
Some mataqalis, he claimed, had only two or three members, yet owned
thousands of idle acres. Others with a large number of members had little
access to land (quoted in Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:33).
Theproblemwentback to Cession. Mataqali whichhadmanymembers in 1 874
shrank over the next century while others grew, yet land ownership did not change
with population. Before Cession, it would have done so automatically, through
accepted mechanisms and warfare.
Labour planned to address these problems by encouraging the use of unused
crown, freehold, and native land (Pacific Islands Monthly, November 1986, p.22).
In July 1986 Bavadra said:
Steps must be taken to nationalise the benefits derived from land use in Fiji...so
that all Fijians not just a few benefit.. . .We must discuss means to achieve a
more equitable distribution of income from rent within the landowning group
as well (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:32).
Such talk, it has been argued, horrified those chiefs who were busily spending
their rent for personal gain, and those who ruled over a mataqali with a few people
and a large amount of land. Other chiefs saw the moves as a threat to the entire
chiefly system. Unfortunately, Bavadradid little to dispel their fears, at onemeeting
saying 'the Fijian people...should question whether they can continue to entrust
theirfuture in such leadership' (quoted in ib«£:34). Ironically, Labour's 'tradition
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threatening' land-use policies would probably have provided a closer approxima
tion to pre-1874 usage than the post-colonial system had achieved.36
The 'eastlwest divide'
Another major source of discontent has been the 'east/west divide' — the
divergence in interests ofFijians in the central and western areas of Viti Levu on the
onehand, andLau, VanuaLevu, andthe eastern coastofViti Levu onthe other. This
division has its origins in the politics ofthe pre-Cession era, and since then has been
accentuated by the political dominance of the eastern chiefs. The colonial govern
ment exacerbated the problem by settling Indians mainly in the west and then
proceeding to develop the 'Fijian' east at its expense. Cane farming, gold mining,
forestry, andtourism have all largely been based in the west, yet governments since
independence have continued the pattern of eastern favouritism (Robertson and
Tamanisau \^SAS-ie).37
Themajorvehicles ofFijianrebellion againstchieflydominancehave all drawn
strength from the east/west divide: Apolosi Nawai's 'Viti Kabani' of the early
twentiethcentury; theWesternUnitedFrontparty ofthe 1970s and 1980s; theFijian
Nationalist Party under Butadroka (an opponent of eastern chiefly dominance);38
and in 1987, the Labour Party. Robertson and Tamanisau, stressing the economic
aspects of the east/west divide over its customary roots, have championed this
explanation for Labour's unpopularity with the ruling class. Labour, they say,
'deliberately set out after 1985 to inherit the tradition of western discontent'
(Robertson and Tamanisau 1988: 1 7). In fact, the majority of observers have given
the east/west divide at least some weight in their explanations of the coup. This is
hardly surprising, as the problem's importancehad already been firmly established
by pre-coup literature. In the face of this almost total consensus, then, Scarr's
dissension seems almost capricious:
The relatively mild linguistic and cultural divide running north-south across . . .
central Viti Levu is sometimes made to bear a heavier political weight than it
will carry (Scarr 1988a:3).39
It is possible that Scarr considers the support shown by western chiefs for the
coup tobe evidence oftheeast/west divide's unimportance. Today 's western chiefs
have, however, shown that they consider themselves to have more in common with
other chiefs (even those from the east) than with commoners (especially Labour
supporters).40 They have attempted to use the coup as an opportunity for their own
advancement: asLawson(1990:15) notes, 'agroupofwestern chiefs (and supporters
of the old Alliance). . .proposed a fourth confederacy for the [western] Yasayasa-
Vakara provinces ' , to match the existing confederacies ofTovata, Burebasaga, and
Kubuna.41
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Nicholas Thomashas questioned whether there actually has been any 'tradition
of western discontent'. His main objection to the concept of the 'east/west divide'
is thatmovementsbased in the westhaveeachdrawn strength from differentregions
and differentcauses ofunrest. Thomas also points to conflict between regions ofthe
west, and the actions of western chiefs just discussed, as signs that the area is not
'unified' in its opposition to the Alliance and the east. But this reasoning overlooks
the many cases where internal divisions within a group have been outweighed by
common interests.42
Thomas also states that
it is questionable whether the 'tradition of western discontent' can be regarded
as a unitary historical phenomenon. The 1876 uprising in the western interior
did involve the issue of political autonomy ... but also reflected a long
precontact history of tribal warfare (Thomas 1990:134).
Thus, by his implication that tribal divisions established before European
contact have little to do with modern Fijian and Fiji politics, Thomas dismisses the
very foundation upon which the east/west divide has been built. In view of the
evidence presented hereto, such a dismissal is quite unjustified.
For various custom-based reasons, then, (as well as the previously discussed
reasons of race and class) Labour, and hence the Coalition, was seen as a threat by
Fiji's chiefs, andits eastern chiefs in particular. Bavadrahimselfserved as aconstant
reminder of that threat. Bavadra's home was a small village in the west.43 He was
headofan itokatoka (a subgroup ofamataqali), and married to amemberofaminor
chiefly family, but to all intents and purposes was a commoner. As Robertson and
Tamanisau (1988:106) put it, commoners were at best to be tolerated, 'as long as
they did not attempt to usurp Mara's chiefly position to all Fiji. The father of
independent Fiji should not be defeated by a commoner'.
What, then, was the chiefly reaction to the Coalition's election victory? They
must have seen it as an attack on all that was dear to them. A sizable minority of
disillusionedFijians had abandoned the chiefly party—the Alliance—for the first
time. Many were westerners, and westerners 'descended on Suva to celebrate
Bavadra's win' (Norton 1990:135). Bavadra (quoted, ibid.:134) had said that 'the
chiefly system should be separated from democratic polities', and seemed to be in
a position to puthis words into effect, at a time when, says Lal ( 1 988a:51 ), the chiefs
' in recent years had begun to harbour ambitions ofenlarged roles for themselves in
modern politics . . . they wanted to be the chiefs of all of Fiji, not just of the Fijian
people'. Bavadra's attempt to demonstrate his respect for tradition by visiting the
Vunivalu of Bau, Ratu Cakobau, would have done little to quell this chiefly unrest
At an Alliance post-election dinner, says Scarr, the Tui Vuda, Ratu Sir Josaia
Tavaiqia, 'was seen to beat upon the table in his sense of frustration at the chiefs'
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government's being overthrownby amanoflesserrank from his own village' (Scarr
1988a:39).
The official reaction from the three most prominent members of the Fijian
chiefly system, Mara, Ganilau, and Cakobau, was outwardly one of calm. Mara
wished the new government well (Pacific Islands Monthly, May 1987, p.l 1), and
Ganilau and Cakobau urged Fijians to respect the people's choice (Pacific Islands
Monthly, June 1987, p.19; although dated June, this issue was prepared before the
coup). Such statements from suchhighly-ranked chiefs would have placated many
unhappyFijians, andprobablyhelpedthenewgovernmentgainacceptance at first.44
Adherents to the custom explanation, however, say that behind the scenes many
chiefs and their supporters were working to aid the Coalition's demise.
According to Robie, their main tool was the Taukei Movement: through it, 'the
chiefly elite had seized on racism as a desperate means of retaining their political
domination' (Robie 1989:217). Robiehas gone into some detail about the tribal and
even family links of various members of the Movement and other players in the
coup, many of whom owed their loyalty to the Tovata confederacy. But the
possibility ofatribal conspiracyhasbeendownplayedbyRobertson andTamanisau:
Close relationships characterize the Fijian ruling class and not only of the
sections supportive of the coup. . . . The coup network was not exclusively
Tovata-based Representatives from other regions were also prominent. . . .
Their allegience is political, not tribal (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:98-99).
For champions of the east/west divide and the theory that eastern chiefs were
behind the coup (although they explain this in class terms), this seems a curious
criticism tomake.Robie's claim is that anetworkofsupportersofthe chiefly system
orchestrated the coup. As the chiefly system favours the east, Tovata people were
prominent in this network. But the chiefly system has many supporters outside the
east; the presence of 'representatives from other regions' in the network therefore
hardly contradicts Robie's thesis.
The TaukeiMovement, Rabuka and chiefly authority
Robertson and Tamanisau themselves state that 'the Taukei movement was
derived from the old Fijian ruling class and replicatedmany of its tribal and kinship
features' (ibid.-9%). But they qualify this description, as do others: the Taukei
Movement was largely a commoner movement. It had some chiefly members, but
no high chiefs; its interests, while closely aligned with those of the chiefs during
April and May 1987, were not identical with eastern chiefly interests. Since the
coup, the power struggle between the Taukei Movement, the eastern chiefly elite,
and Rabuka (who has aligned himself with one or the other as necessary for his own
purposes)hasbecomecomplicated. This is little surprise;now thatthe Coalition and
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Indians have been almost completely removed from the political picture, internal
divisions within thepro-coupforces havehadroom to develop and become obvious.
Some in theMovement have even complained about the high chiefs ' domination of
the Republic's government, embracing the same concept (that high chiefs should
remain separate from politics) which caused Bavadra so many problems. In all of
these machinations, the Movement, Norton says, has resembled ' earlier episodes of
ethnic militancy', in that it has been 'unable to promote a Fijian ethnicity separately
fromthe ideology andsymbolism that affirmed the legitimacy ofchiefly leadership'
(Norton 1990:147).
But after the April election and at the height of the coup, these problems wen
yet to emerge. The Taukei Movement was then staunchly pro-chief. At its first
meeting a prominent Kubuna chief lamented that 'Ratu Mara's government has
been defeated and so all the chiefs in the land have been defeated'.43 One of the
Movement's leaders, TanielaVeitata,reported thatthesewords 'stirred [members',
hearts'; 'The basis of the Taukei Movement', Veitata proclaimed, 'is that the chiefs
are fromGod and the Fijians are to uphold the chiefly system' (quoted in ibid.:l 39-
40).
Rabuka attended Taukei Movement meetings before launching his coup, and
his interests appeared to be broadly aligned with those of the Movement. At the
height of the coup he preferred to describe himself more as a fellow-traveller than
as a member of the Movement. There is no question, though, that Rabuka believed
in customaryvalues; this beliefis implicitin No CMerWtey.'Thechiefsarethe wise
men in Fijian society, guardians of our tradition', he said in July; 'take that power
away and give it to the commoners and you are asking for trouble' (quoted in Lai
1988a:52).
One of the better accounts ofRabuka's ties to the eastern chiefly elite has been
givenby Scarr. Rabuka, Scan says, identifies himselfas a bati, a fightingman ofhis
turaga or chief (who happens to be Ganilau). Customarily, says Scan*, 'the
relationship between turaga and bati was symbiotic. The bati as defender of the
borders was a very independent vassal. His support that gave the chiefpower could
be withdrawn' (Scarr 1988a: 131 ).46Rabukaconsidered his actions to be forcing the
hand of the high chiefs; he was acting boldly whereas they had made only timid
moves in public. He was, however, somewhat unsure of the level of their support,
if not that of the wider chiefly community. Had the high chiefs opposed his coup,
he may well have withdrawn and accepted failure. At one stage, when Rabuka
considered the governor-general to be an intransigent opponent, he announced to a
gathering of 700 troops: "The penalty for treason is death and if this is to be my
destiny, then I will accept it' (quoted in Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:78).
>
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Ganilau and Mara, however, to Rabuka's great relief, both came out in support of
the broad thrust of his coup (see section 5, this paper).
Had they so wished, the ability of all chiefs to stop the coup could have been
significant. They still commanded the loyalty ofmost village Fijians (Ganilau once
asserted that there was nothing the chiefs could not ask of their villagers—Keith-
Reid 1982: 17). Strong condemnation from chiefs of Rabuka's actions would have
left him withnopower-base. But the defeat of the Bavadra government was in their
interests. To get an exact measure of the thinking of the chiefly community before
the coup is difficult, as its prominent collective body, the Great Council of Chiefs,47
didnotmeet in April orearly May. But immediately afterthe coup, the chiefs ' strong
feelings became clear. The Council met on 20 May and immediately endorsed the
coup (Scarr 1988a:86), prompting Rabuka to call the Council his 'biggest fan club'
(quoted in Lal 1988a:52). The chiefs 'saw the coup and a changed constitution as
a last attempt to restore a false memory of Fijian unity and chiefly respect'
(Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:131).
Post-coup 'consensus' government
In the years immediately following the coup, the Great Council of Chiefs acted
as Fiji's surrogate parliament. The chiefs took particular advantage of the process
ofconstitutional revision whichRabuka set in motion. The Council 's early propos
als were aimed at restoring 'consensus ' government, under which Fijians wouldno
longervotedirectly forparliamentary candidates, butwouldexercise their influence
at the village, district, and provincial levels. Tagupa has described the consensus
system as
requiring prolonged discussions in a formal, face-to-face setting, punctuated
with ceremony and protocol. The opinions of paramount personalities are
accorded deference and great weight. Most important, personal accusations, a
favourite device for politicians, are avoided altogether as a vulgar breach of
protocol (Tagupa 1988:139).
Such a system would eliminate almost all possibilities for dissent within the
Fijian community, exactly as the chiefs would wish.
The consensus system did not persist into the final version of Fiji's new
constitution, promulgatedbypresidentialdecreeon25 July 1990."Thesystemfinally
enacted,however, as Don Dunstan49 has described, 'provides a means by which Fiji
would be ruled by an oligarchy of Fijian chiefs and their associates however the
majority of citizens were to vote' (Dunstan 1990:9). The extent of this chiefly
domination deserves close attention. Under the 1990 constitution the Great Council
of Chiefs50 chooses 24 of the 34 members of the Senate, and the president (who will
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thus almost certainly remain a high chief). The president, in turn, chooses nine
senators,51 and chooses the prime minister from the House ofRepresentatives. On
the prime minister's advice, the president appoints the various ministers, who can
be drawn from the appointed upper house as well as the elected lower house. Thus,
those occupying almost all of the key governing positions of Fiji are or can be
appointed rather than elected.
The prime minister remains an elected representative, and must command the
support of the majority in the lower house, but the electoral system virtually
guarantees thatthis majority will be supportiveofeasternchiefly rule. Naturally, the
possibility ofany significant sharing ofpowerwith Indians has beenremoved: they
elect only 27 of the 70 seats. One seat has gone to Rotumans, and five have gone to
those who do not qualify to vote as Fijians, Indians, or Rotumans.
But it is the method of electing the 37 Fijian seats which is most telling. Their
domination by supporters of chiefly rule has been guaranteed in a number ofways.
First, all seats in the House arenow elected communally, so Fijian seats are elected
by Fijians only; the Fijian seats won by Labour in 1987 were national seats, with
voting on a common roll, and would not have been so won without Indian votes.52
Secondly, only fiveFijian seats (14 percent) are allottedtourban areas, where a third
of all Fijians live; urban Fijian voters had been critical to the Coalition's success.
Thirdly, the32provincial seats are 'unevenlydistributed, againheavily advantaging
the supporters ofthe regime' (ibid.). For example, Lau with 14,000 Fijianshas three
seats, as does Ba (in the west) with 55,000; Rewa and Naitasiri with 98,000 Fijians
havefour seats, while Namosi has two seats for4,000. Finally, all Fijian voters must
be enrolled or establish their eligibility to be enrolled in the Vola ni Kawa Bula, the
register of Fijians in their customary family units which establishes any rights to
land. Many Fijians (particularly those living in towns or away from their home
province) are not so enrolled, and would be discouraged from doing so by the
complicated process involved. Thus they are and will likelyremainineligible to vote
as Fijians (ibid.). They will be forced tovoteon the 'others ' roll, which inturnmeans
that the five 'others' seats could well be held by Fijians.53
Not only Indians, but also the majority of Fijians, have been electorally
discriminated against in the 1990 constitution. Furthermore, the constitution's
protection of chiefly interests goes beyond the electoral system. Freedom of
expression may be limited by laws
for the purpose of protecting the reputation, the dignity and esteem of institu
tions and values of the Fijian people, in particular the Bose Levu Vakaturaga
[Great Council of Chiefs] and the traditional Fijian system and titles (Section
13[2][d]).
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Freedom of movement may be restricted 'in the interests of defence, public
safety, public order, [or] public morality' (Section 15[3][b]). Amajorfuturerolefor
the army is also guaranteed: the RFMF is to ensure 'the security, defence and well
being of Fiji and its peoples' (Section 94[3]).
None of the operative parts of the constitution can be altered except by a two-
thirds vote in both houses, including the votes of at least 18 of the 24 senators
appointed by the Council of Chiefs. The 1990 constitution therefore guarantees that
power in Fiji will remain with the chiefs and their supporters.
The chiefs could hardly have gained more by the coup. This, of course, is the
reason why those whoknew of it beforehand made no effort to prevent it, and why
most supported itonce ithadhappened. It also leaves open the strongpossibility that
somemayhavehelpedplan it. Thechiefs ' motivewasfear: fearoflosing theirpower
tocommoners and Indians; fearofmodernclass politics diminishing theirrelevance;
fear of losing the respect and support of disenchanted commoners. The race, class,
and custom explanations all help explain the motivesbehind the coup, but the chiefs
and their staunch supporters were the critical element in ensuring its success. The
coup's initial popularity withmanyFijians was due largely to theefforts ofthis elite,
whoclaimed that theonly issues involved were the simplistic issues ofraceand land,
and that the coup would benefit all Fijians. Neither claim was true— as more and
more Fijians have come to realize in the years since.
Only one event confuses the post-coup picture of chiefly interest: Rabuka's
second intervention. On 25 September 1987 Rabuka reasserted military control,
announcing thatGanilau'sinterimgovernmenthadstrayedfromthecoup'sobjectives.
At first, this seems to cast doubt upon the custom analysis; as Robertson and
Tamanisau point out: 'despite his rhetoric of compliance to [sic] the chiefs,
[Rabuka's] second coup overthrew the country's two highest chiefs, Ganilau and
Mara' (Robertson andTamanisau 1988: 1 52). The champions of the racial explana
tion for the coup hold this up as further validation of their argument; Rabuka, they
say, brought the interim government back into line with the goals of the Fijian race.
The second intervention was prompted by the Deuba Accords, an agreement
reached between the Coalition and the Alliance for both to take part in a new
caretakergovernmentunderGanilau. During AugustandSeptember, supportfor the
Coalitionhad been growing, partly in response to Fiji 's chaotic post-coup economy
and a dramatically increased crime rate. The Coalition's 'Operation Sunrise'
campaignreceived, in the (perhaps exaggerated) wordsofRobertsonandTamanisau,
'massive support' in Fijian villages. In mid-September a poll claimed a 'massive
loss of Fijian support for the interim government' (ibid.: 134-35). According to
Robertson and Tamanisau, Mara and Ganilau, both 'old party stalwarts',
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read the writing on the wall. Their survival lay in collaborating with the
Coalition, not in pursuing the Taukeist vision. ... If [the Alliance] could ride on
the wave of the Coalition revival, something might be salvaged (ibid.).
During meetings in Deuba (which were greeted with noisy demonstrations by
the diminished Taukei Movement) the Alliance, the Coalition, and Ganilau forged
adeal whichpromised to setFiji on theroad to respectability. Bavadraagreed to drop
a challenge to the legality ofGanilau's dismissal ofhis government which had been
before the courts. Ganilau claimed that the consensus deal had Rabuka's support;
buttheAccords 'shocked theTaukeiMovement' (ibid.: 138). The coup, Norton says,
had created sufficient 'confusion about the locus of ethnic leadership' for Rabuka
to yield to Taukei Movement anger and stage a second military intervention
(1990:145). A convincing rationale for the intervention has been given by van
Fossen:
[The Deuba Accords] appeared to give little or nothing to the minor [chiefs]
and ethnic extremists who had risen to public prominence since the first coup
and who favoured the recent recommendations of the Great Council of Chiefs
which would carry Fiji into the second stage of ethnic relations. But more
crucially [they] gave little assurance to Rabuka and his fellow officers whohad
led the first coup and who were fearful of their future if civilian rule returned
(vanFossen 1987:30).
The second intervention, then, was carried out against the two highest chiefs
(and the possibility of any future role by the Coalition) to guarantee the interests of
the majority of chiefs and for Rabuka's own protection. The authors of No Other
Way admit that Rabuka 'didn't trust the caretaker government as far as his own
safety was concerned' (Dean and Ritova 1988:104). Rabuka thought that the
Coalition and 'other prominentpeople in society, some chiefs in the mountains, and
some who would like to be chiefs' had been 'influencing Ratu Sir Penaia and
changing his direction' (quoted in ibid.:\05). The east/west divide ('chiefs in the
mountains' being from central Viti Levu, the area with the most egalitarian
customary structure) was therefore another factor in the intervention.
Of all observers, it is Scarr who best argues that the second intervention did not
contravene custom:
It took avery rigid view ofcustom to claim it would not envisage or accommo
date the bati going against the turaga. Bati have actually overthrown turaga
before now, sometimes thereupon discovering themystical essence ofpower in
themselves and taking over the state (Scarr 1988a: 1 33).M
Neither did the two turaga remain resentful for long. Mara at first said he felt
'cast aside' and was 'going off to fish and play golf (ibid.:\30 — as shown in the
next chapter, 'leaving others to it' was a favourite political tactic ofMara's). But at
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a meeting on 5 OctoberwithRabuka, Bavadra, and Ganilau, Mara said that hefound
Rabuka's minimum demands 'acceptable' (Bain 1989:195). Two months later he
becameprime minister oftheRepublic. Ganilau appeared, at first, more intractable,
saying 'They will have to dragme out, either dead or in irons' (quoted in Robertson
and Tamanisau 1988:143). But by 5 December he, too, was happy to accept the
presidency of the Republic. A letter leaked from within Fiji to The Australian also
reveals that Ganilauhad at leastfourdays ' warningofthe Taukei Movement 's plans
for a second intervention (The Australian 26 September 1987).
The dismissal by Rabuka of the military/Taukei Movement government which
had ruled Fiji from the second intervention to S December, and the subsequent
reintroduction of the eastern chiefly elite, outraged some lesser chiefs and Move
ment members who wished to maintain their newly found power and increased
status. ButRabukahad given notice ofhis intentions a month after the intervention:
I hope it will not be long before I can hand it back to these two high chiefs to run
the country. It has always been the wish of the Fijian people that their country
should be led by chiefs, and this is what we aim to do (Message from Rabuka to
his homevillage of Drekeniwai, quoted in Dean and Ritova 1988: 10S).
The language of custom (or rather, the language of 'tradition') has been
prominent in the propaganda of post-coup governments. The strengthening of the
chiefly systemhas been trumpeted as the strengthening of all the 'traditions ' Fijians
hold dear. This has undoubtedly been of great importance in bestowing validity
upon the post-coup regime in the eyes of village Fijians.
But while the government almost certainly believes in the ideal of 'tradition',
the impact its economic policy is having upon the foundations of Fijian culture—
that is, day-to-day social and economic concerns—is undermining that very ideal .
TheRepublic ofFiji ' s Minister for Trade and Commerce, Berenado Vunibobo, has ,
says Robertson, 'made it clear that in its rush to achieve the status of the first newly
industrialized country in the South Pacific, Fiji cannot "afford to bend to environ
mental concerns'" (Robertson 1990:123, quoting Vunibobo). The government's
economic policy is one of replacing cane fields with factories. For a government
whichwishes touphold 'tradition', theeffectofthis policy ofintensive development
is ironical, to say the least. It is hard to imagine anything more devastating to the
Fijians' village-based way of life than a full-scale industrial revolution. Further
more, a total disregardforFiji 's environment (hardly carefully protected as it is)can
only have a detrimental effect upon that same land which is uppermost among
Fijians' concerns.55
Talkby the coup-makers of 'tradition' appears, therefore, to be largely rhetoric.
It is doubtful whether safeguarding 'traditional' political culture will also safeguard
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Fijians ' everyday traditions. The rhetoric of tradition, however, like the rhetoric of
race, has been critical to the success ofthe coup. Ithas shoredup grass-roots support
for the ' tradition' foremost in the coup-makers ' minds : chiefly political dominance.
3 EXPLANATIONS INVOLVING SPECIFIC INTEREST
Themotivations of specific organizations and individuals are the main subject ofLal's
Power and Prejudice (1988a). Lal considers the coup to have been 'more about
frustrated politicians bent upon recapturing power lost at the polls than . . . about ethnic
prejudice' (ibid.:7). His analysis treats each systemic factor as only one element
among the many which make up an explanation for the coup. While this approach
tends to undervalue some factors, it does allow valuable insights to be made into the
motivations ofkey players.
This section deals with the 'specific interests' of four groupings of organiza
tions and individuals: first, the United States and other external forces; secondly,
Rabuka and the RFMF; thirdly, the governor-general; and fourthly, Mara.
The United States and other external forces
The promise by the Bavadra government to ban nuclear ship visits to Fiji, although
merely a reversion to pre-1983 Fiji government policy, was considered by many
observers to be a threat to US interests in the Pacific. This and some of the events
surrounding the coup raised the possibility of CIA involvement in the coup's planning
and execution.
Given the CIA's track record, it is no surprise that such suspicions should arise;
as Ralph Premdas says, ' the behavior of the US in other parts of the Third World is
powerfully suggestive' (Premdas 1989:109). These suspicions increased dramati
cally two days after the coup when the Sydney Morning Herald reported an 'un
named Pentagon source' as saying 'we're kinda delighted.. . . All of a sudden our
ships couldn't go into Fiji, and now all of a sudden they can' (quoted in Wilkes
1987:4). This anonymous quotation has probably done more to keep the 'CIA
theory' alive than anything else.
The theory's primary champion has been Owen Wilkes, whose argument
appears in an article published in various New Zealand newsletters.* The theory
gained further exposure when a similar article by Joann Wypijewski was reprinted
by the prominent magazine Pacific Islands Monthly (October 1987, pp.46-48; the
article was first published in the New York-based The Nation) and when Wendy
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Bacon produced a report for SBS Television's 'Dateline' programme following
Rabuka's second intervention (see Robie 1989:244-45).
Wilkes argues that 'the US since 1982 has been increasingly intervening in
Fijian political, economic and trade union affairs', and notes 'a visit by America's
foremost coup-maker [General Vernon Walters] and a stepping up of CIA activity
immediately prior to the coup' (Wilkes 1987:4). His evidence for the former is the
involvement in Fiji's affairs of various American-backed organizations, such as
Business International, the Pacific Islands Development Program, and the Asian-
American Free Labor Institute, all allegedly linked to the CIA. As for Vernon
Walters, 'America's top expert on coups' (ibid.:!) Wilkes says:
There is no evidence he was actively involved in coup preparation. Presum
ably, however, he conveyed some sort of assurance to whoever was planning
the coup that US assistance and support would be forthcoming (ibid. :8).
JoannWypijewski , after covering similar ground to Wilkes, alsonotes deposed
Deputy Speaker Noor Dean's conviction that 'the men who arrested him and his
colleagues were not Fijian' (Pacific Islands Monthly October 1987, p.48). At least
some were blacked up with shoe polish, all wore masks, and none spoke — the
implication being that they were US soldiers, not Fijians. According to Wilkes,
Edrick Sherman, the deputy chief of the US Embassy in Suva and 'probable head
ofthe CIA team', was 'reportedly seen accompanying Rabuka on several occasions
after the coup' (Wilkes 19875).
The chief adversary ofthis theory has been Michael Danby ( 1988), who argues
that it is the result of a Soviet disinformation campaign. Danby follows the trail of
key news stories from 'Moscow's principal front organization, the World Peace
Council ' (ibid. :43) to fringepublications and from there to themainstream press. He
dismisses allegations that 'the body movements' of the soldiers taking over Fiji's
parliament were those of American blacks as 'racist drivel'; the argument that US
mercenaries were involved, he says, is 'patronizing' towards Fijians, who are
perfectly capable of 'organizing and executing their own rebellions' (ibid/AS).
Danby does convincingly refute some of the more outlandish claims of US
involvement in the coup; a Soviet disinformation campaign, too, seems quite
possible. But Danby's argument shares some of the weaknesses of the CIA theory
itself. Wilkes points to organizations with 'alleged CIA links', while Danby points
to 'frontorganisations ' and typecasts Wilkes as a ' sourceofinformation for a whole
network of hard-left activists, working to extend New Zealand's anti-US policy to
the rest of the Pacific' (ibid.:46). In this sea of allegations there are few solid facts.
This has been reflected in discussions ofthe CIA theory by the majorobservers:
few commit themselves to a position. After examining the evidence, Robertson and
Tamanisau conclude on a note of doubt (1988:93, 108): 'Many questions remain
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unanswered. US reactions after the coup might simply represent opportunism'.
They think it 'unlikely that the US was a prime mover' of the events of May.
Scan is, not surprisingly, sceptical: 'The Royal Fiji Military Forces haveneve
struck people whoknow them with the impression they wouldneed CIA incitement
orhelp.. .to carry outacoup' (Scan 1988a:53). He says the visit ofGeneral Walters,
'that alleged harbinger ofAmerican coups', was 'long-planned'. And, in a swipe at
Indian parliamentarians, he suggests that the soldiers carrying out the coups looked
perfectly Fijian— to Fijians (ibid.:53-54).
Lai discounts the wilder allegations of US soldiers actually taking part in the
coup (like Scarr, he notes thatRabuka was heard speaking in Fijian to his men) . But
he does not discount the overall possibility of US involvement:
Not all the evidence is in. . .. The allegation that some [US] Embassy officials
may have passed money and perhaps even material to members of the Taukei
Movement is entirely within die realms of possibility. The real question is not
whether the US was involved, but how deeply was it involved (Lai 1988a:36).
Robie, who draws heavily on Wilkes, notes the circumstantial nature of the
evidence, but says 'there are too many coincidences for the possibility to be
dismissed out ofhand. Some involvement would not have been inconsistent with a
CIA agenda' (Roobie 1989:247).
But most who, on the one hand, say US involvement is a fair possibility, on the
other hand admit that doubts will always exist. Events since the coup have given
little firm evidence either way. Allegations in July 1987 ofUS plans for a military
base in Fiji werequickly denied (Wypijewski 1 987:46). Maraclaimed soon after the
coup that George Schulz hadpromisedUS aid for Fiji if Australia and NewZealand
imposedtradeembargoes(Robertson andTamanisau 1988:88),buttheUS was 'one
of the few countries to suspend aid after the first coup' (van Fossen 1987:24),S7 and
any promise made by Schultz has since been overshadowed by France's generous
military aid to Rabuka (see, for example, Robie 1990:24-26).
That the US has not defended democracy in Fiji as vehemently as one might
prefer is insufficient evidence for US involvement in the coup. The US's feting of
Fiji's military (Wilkes 1987:6-7), and its wooing of Mara (who responded by
revoking the pre-1983 ban on nuclear-ship visits without consulting his cabinet), is
no more than one would expect of a country looking after its own interests. Wilkes
has, since 1987, come to the conclusion that the coup was actually counter
productive toUS interests (see Robie 1989:247); butjust as this does notremove the
possibility that theUS helped plan the coup, neither does theprobability that theUS
was 'kinda delighted' by the coup mean that it was involved.
The US is not the only external candidate which has been suggested as a likely
instigator of the coup. Robie suggests that the influence of Australian and New
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Zealand businessmen such as Jeffrey Reid, the manager ofEmperor Mines (which
operates a large gold mine in Fiji), was 'probably evenmorecrucial ' than that of the
US. Reid enjoys a close relationship with Mara and Ganilau, and, says Robie,
the Fiji Labour Party's threat to nationalise the [Vatukoula] mine, later with
drawn, no doubt played a much larger role in the events of 14 May 1987 than
did the stated intention to introduce a non-nuclear policy similar to that ofNew
Zealand (iWi:247-48).
Bavadra has relayed reports that Reid funded the Taukei Movement and spoke
at public meetings in support of it (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:67), but the
direct involvementofReid in marshalling these forces and provoking the coup is as
difficult to substantiate as that of the CIA. Reid's public support would, however,
have helped increase the confidence of Fiji's anti-Coalition forces.
Premdas (1989:109), for one, says that the theory of external intervention,
which 'brings together the role ofcertain multinationals , certain ex-ministers ofthe
previous government, and the possible role of theUS ' and points to 'a coincidence
of interests accidentally or conspiratorially converging', in his view 'best explains
the coup'.58 But the arguments in the theory's defence are characterized by scantily
supported and often qualified allegations, and doubt exists on either side of the
debate, to the point where it is given little credence today. Whatever the truthbehind
it, external intervention is therefore probably the least useful explanation for the
coup. It also has the unfortunate effect of devaluing, in the minds of some foreign
observers, the powerful internal explanations discussed hitherto.
Rabuka and the RFMF
Rabuka, as the leader of the coup, is the most important of the many players in any
coup explanation. He has always maintained that he acted alone in its planning. If this
claim is accepted at face value, then an explanation for the coup need go no further
than Rabuka's personal motives. Unfortunately, these motives were not as logical and
obvious as one might prefer. They included a personal interpretation of race and
custom, as has been noted in previous chapters; but private motives were also in
volved. Thesemotives were nonetheless important, in that they strengthened Rabuka's
determination to act as less single-minded people would not have acted. Tribal or
ruling class conspiracies would have come to nought had a suitable agent not been at
hand.
Robertson and Tamanisau suggest that Rabuka's views would have been well
known in the appropriate 'small social and political circles'. As a result, 'only one
person needed to approach him and suggest what they were seeking. He reportedly
had his own axes to grind' (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:107).
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What were these 'axes to grind'? Among other things, Rabuka feared that the
Coalition would endanger Fiji's allegiance to the Queen (rather ironic, in view of
his later declaration of a republic). Also revealed in his account of the coup is an
obsession with the threat ofRussian and Libyan expansionism in the Pacific: 'there
was, in his assessment, a very real likelihood of India increasing its influence in Fiji
— "and behind India stands Russia'" (quoted in Dean and Ritova 1988:48). This
was despite the Coalition's pledge not to allow a Russian embassy to be opened in
Fiji (seePacific Islands MonthlyMay 1987, p. 14). In fact, the biggestRussian story
in Fiji's immediate past concerned actions ofthe Alliance: Mara 'rocked theregion'
in 1986 when he announced that Fiji might negotiate a fishing agreement with the
USSR (Pacific Islands Monthly August 1986, pp.20-26). Rabuka's fear ofLabour
Party 'socialism' ignored the pragmatism and caution shown by the Bavadra
government; hesawamodernsocial democratic party in termsof 1 950s stereotypes.
Lalhas given afurther explanationforRabuka's fearofa Coalition government.
For some years, the Royal Fiji Military Forces had exercised a 'blatantly discrimi
natory admission policy' against Indians (Lal 1988a:55). A Coalition minister,
shortly after the election, approached the RFMF to see what steps could be taken
towards admitting more non-Fijians (ibid.:51); the government also announced a
review of the army's role in the nation. Both moves would have disturbed Rabuka:
The army was close to Rabuka's heart, and the prospect ofunacceptable reform
in its operations and structuremay have helped to convince him to act before it
was too late (ibid.).
Rabuka's own briefing notes, handed to the soldiers who carried out the coup,
suggest that Lal's conclusion is too equivocal. Rabuka makes very clear the
importance he accords the RFMF:
FOREIGN POLICY
GG's position very difficult as he will be forced to accept policies which are
against traditional interests but most importantly against the interests of the
RFMF.
DEFENCE POLICY
They are likely to introduce measures to gain political control over RFMF e.g.
intro ofracial parity principle.. . .This we cannot and should never accept.
MISSION
To overthrow the govt and install a new regime that will ensure that theRFMF
and national interests are protected.
('Opord 1/87' reproduced in Dean and Ritova 1988:21-22).
Rabuka's view of the importance of the military in developing nations springs,
in part, from his experience ofwriting a thesis on that very subject. Dean andRitova
46
describe his year (1979) spent at the Indian Defence Services Staff College as 'one
of the most influential in his career. . .deeply affecting, and directing, his political
attitudes andopinions ' (ibid. :28). Robie,however, has described theresult ofhis ten
months there as ' a dubious MSc "degree" ' which is ' a frequent topic ofbarjokes by
his civilian and military colleagues' (Robie 1989:227-28). Rabuka had twice failed
NewZealand's UniversityEntranceexaminations. His thesis was saidtobe 'heavily
plagiarised from other writings on military coups' (ibid. :228).
By 1987, then, coups had long been on Rabuka's mind. Rabuka, says Lal, has
acknowledged thathe thoughtofacoupin 1977 whenthe Alliancewas (temporarily,
as it turned out) defeated by the NFP: 'By his own admission. . .the Colonel had
plottedtooverthrowaduly elected governmentbyforceofarmsforquitesometime'
(Lal 1988a:9-10). By the time Bavadra's government was in place, his mind was
made up: 'He decided on the military option the day the election results started to
come out' (Som Prakash, review ofRabuka--No Other Way in Prasad 1988:102).
A concern for his personal future would also have been on Rabuka's mind. The
commander of the RFMF, Brigadier Epeli Nailatikau, left the country four days
before the coup, after stating thathewas definitely going ahead with a court-martial
for Rabuka. (Rabuka had disobeyed orders some years before by allowing a senior
officer to return to Fiji from the Middle East for his father's funeral. See Scarr
1988a:66.) Rabuka, therefore, had to act while Nailatikauwas away, ifhe was to act
at all.
Rabuka's military obsessions and fears, coupled with his personal theories
about race and tradition, are almost enough to make his No Other Way claims of
'going it alone' sound convincing. But even if those claims are accepted, Rabuka
couldnothavestagedhis coupwithout his fellow soldiers ' cooperation. Jim Sanday
(1989)59 and John Dalton (1990) have investigated the role of the RFMF, and have
found thatmostofits predominantlyFijianmemberswere supporters ofthe Alliance
and the chiefs. This trend was noted in 1978 by sociologist Cema Bolabola:
To the Fijians a military career is a new symbol of power and a "weapon in
favour ofchiefs". Thus in the event of any threat to their status, support for the
chiefly system from the army would be guaranteed (Bolabola (1978: 158).
Coveted military positions had long served as ' amajor source ofAlliance Party
patronage' (Howard 1990:1 1 ) and the 'conservative power elite became dominant
within the officer corps' (Dalton 1990:5). Sanday says that the appointment in 1982
of 'a member from the ruling chiefly class to command the RFMF (Ratu Epeli
Nailatikau)...reinforced the ascendancy of Fijian traditional values within the
military' (Sanday 1989:12). Most members of the RFMF would not only have
shared Rabuka's fears for its future, but also would have shared his fears about
threats to chiefly dominance.
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The army's highest-ranking officers, Brigadier Nailatikau and Lieutenant-
Colonel Sanday, were both committed to upholding due constitutional processes.
But others were thoroughly ' socialised in the values ofthe conservativeruling elite '
(ibid.).60 Scarr (1988a:66-68) says that they saw the first- and second-in-command
officers as 'out of touch' and preferred to follow the third-in-command, Rabuka
Rabuka wouldhavehad little difficulty infinding coup-makers andcoup-supporters
among his fellow soldiers.61
There is more to a successful coup, however, than the act. The motives of
Rabuka and thearmy were a necessary causeofthe events ofthemorningof 14 May,
but were hardly sufficient to ensure the coup's success. That success was ensured
by more powerful forces. This does not diminish the importance of Rabuka
personal motives, however, for Rabuka's motives made him a willing 'hired gun'
(to use Lai's term) of the more powerful forces at work in Fiji (Lai 1988a:57).
The governor-general
In the weeks following 14 May 1987, many pro-Coalition and pro-democracy forces
inside and outside Fiji (including the governments of Australia, New Zealand, and
Britain) placed their faith in the governor-general, whom they saw as offering the best
chance for a return to pre-coup democracy or some broadly acceptable substitute. It
has since been suggested that this faith was misplaced all along.
Ratu SirPenaia Ganilau ' sbackground did not support thepictureofanunbiased
mediator which governments and the press tried to paint of him after the coup. He
was 'a former soldier, steeped in military tradition and a former [Alliance] Minister
ofDefense' (West 1987:224), andhad also beendeputy prime ministerunder Mara.
Ganilau was not pleased by the Coalition's victory, as Scarr reports:
When the new prime minister was sworn in ..., it struck him the governor-
general was not a happy man. Adi Kuini Bavadra, brought up for part of her
childhood in Ratu Sir Penaia's own household, felt uncomfortable. The ritual
tea-drinking was short on conversation (Scarr 1988a:39).
Ganilau's Alliance sympathies were compounded by his position as a promi
nent chief. He had long shared the fears of fellow chiefs that they were losing the
support ofthe Fijian community. Lawsonquotes one ofhis many pre-coup remarks
on the subject:
[Ganilau] said a lot depended on the command and respect the chiefs had and
received from their people. He said peoplemust be educated and told to respect
their chiefs. "This process mustbegin within the communities through teaching
pre-school children the importance of traditional leaders and the respect they
should have for them" (excerpt from a Fiji Department of Information press
release, quotedby Lawson 1988a:16).
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In the period immediately before the coup, Ganilau had been appointed Tui
Cakau-elect, paramount chief of the Cakaudrove confederacy (to which Rabuka
belongs), an appointment whichmightnot have been guaranteedhad it notbeenfor
Taukei Movement support. Robie (1987:12) has suggested that this may have
swayed him in favour of the Movement.
Ganilau, says Scarr, had been warned by the Movement of its plans to bring
down the Coalition through a 'civilian coup' (Scarr 1988a:65) and Rabuka has said
that he told Ganilau on 9 May that 'ifhe did not stage a political coup, I would stage
a military coup ' (quoted, ibid. :69). The governor-general passed none of this on to
the prime minister. Bavadra had, like many, heard similar rumours, but had not
believed them; a warningfrom such a notable as Ganilauwouldhavedemandedthat
precautionary measures be taken. Scarr is, however, forgiving of Ganilau's over
sight: 'Ratu Sir Penaia does not always hear Sitiveni Rabuka very clearly' (ibid.).
Ganilau was certainly well-disposed towards Rabuka; he knew him well,
having even been manager of Rabuka's rugby team (see Dean and Ritova 1988,
photo insert). Significantly, in 1985 he intervened to have charges of court-martial
against Rabuka dropped (Robie 1987:12), and in 1987 was trying to do so again,
despite thefact that it was 'way outside his constitutional powers' (Scarr 1988a:66).
Events at Government House on 14 May suggest, ifnot his inside knowledge, then
an incredibly forgiving attitude towards Rabuka. Robie reports that:
When Colonel Rabuka arrived shortly after [the coup] at Government House
his first words to Ratu Ganilau were: "Well, sir, I've done it!" (Robie 1987: 12).
(Scarr [1988a:73] disputes this, saying that Rabuka instead 'referred to his
having effected what the chiefs wanted'.) Lieutenant-Colonel Sanday had been
called out to Government House by Ganilau and was there when Rabuka arrived
(possibly, speculates Robie [1989:220], to get him out of the way). Scarr describes
the following moments:
Soon afterwards, suspended, Sanday was seen to come out with tears in his
eyes. The complete professional, he had waited for the commander-in-chiers
order to use the weapons Ratu Sir Penaia had available but no order had come.
Sid was the favourite (Scarr 1988a:74).
Ganilau'spossibleunderlying supportforRabuka's actions conflicted,however,
with his responsibilities as governor-general, about which Fiji's judiciary were
anxious toremind him. At2 p.m. on 14 May, the chiefjustice approached him with,
as Lal puts it, 'inexplicably unsought legal advice that the purported suspension of
the Fiji constitution was "illegal and invalid'" (Lal 1988a:74), and offered him the
judges ' 'undivided and complete loyalty ' . Nowmore sureofhis constitutional role,
Ganilau issued a statement condemning the coup as 'unlawful' and announcing his
assumption of executive authority (ibid.:%\-%2).
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This brought Ganilau under intense pressure from outside Fiji to stand firm. He
received a message of encouragement from the Queen (which, as a committed
monarchist, as aremany Fijians, he would have foundvery persuasive), and foreign
governments chose to recognize him as the legitimate authority during the crisis.
Soon afterwards, however, Ganilau's actions began to fail the test of legality, both
constitutionally andunder the doctrine ofnecessity . This case is arguedby Ghai and
Cottrell in their legal work, Heads ofState in the Pacific (Ghai and Cornell 1990)
Ganilau, they say, given his chiefly sway over Rabuka, could have 'tried harder to
persuadeRabuka toreturn the military to the barracks' (ibid. :215). On 19 May Ganilau
granted amnesty to Rabuka and his collaborators, dissolved parliament, and
dismissed Bavadra's government. These actions were not only constitutionally
illegal, they had 'nojustification' under the doctrine ofnecessity. By these actions
Ganilau
made other solutions highly unlikely, . . . [he] sidelined the Coalition leaders
and weakened their legal ami political position, . . . [and] he went a long way to
consolidate the coup, its leaders and objectives (ibid.).
Furthermore, Ganilau made no attempt to restore the 1970 constitution:
When the Governor-General talked ofreturn to parliamentary government, he
had in mind a new constitutional dispensation more in line with the thinking of
Rabuka and his taukei associates (ibid.:2l6-ll).
Ganilau initially encountered opposition from the Great Council of Chiefs for
his perceptibly anti-coup stand. His difficulty, he told its 20May meeting, was that,
as Lai (1988a:87) reports, 'whatever his personal feelings...his oath of office
required him to uphold the existing constitution'. After further lobbying from the
Council, Ganilau assured its members that 'we are all aiming at the same result
generally, but that we are considering different methods of achieving this'. This
assurance was followed by his announcement of a 'compromise' Council of
Advisors dominated by Fijian Alliance members (many ofwhom were also Taukei
Movementmembers). Rabuka delightedly noted that he 'personally endorsed 14 of
the 18 members' (ibid.: 88-89).
While there appears to be no solid evidence that Ganilau was involved in the
coup's planning, his actions during May and June 1987 were clearly critical to its
success. Rabuka's own biographers concede that 'the coup leader needed the
governor-general's acquiescence, at the very least' (Dean and Ritova 1988:74).
Perhaps his greatestvalueforRabuka was that 'thecloakoftherule ofthe governor-
general protected the regime from the full force of foreign as well as domestic
opposition' (Ghai and Cottrell 1990:216).
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Ganilau's stand duringRabuka's second intervention notwithstanding,62he has
demonstrated a broad support for the coup's aims, to the extent that he is now
president of the Republic of Fiji. Perhaps the most pointed comment on Ganilau's
post-coup actions was made by Bavadra's senior legal counsel, Dr John Cameron,
in a July 1987 letter to The Bulletin: 'If this is neutrality, God help democracy and
non-Fijians if he ever decides to take sides with the Fijians'.0
Mara
Fiji's most prominent politician, and the person most often singled out as a possible
instigator ofthe coup, is Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. Rabuka described Mara's support as
his 'trump card'. When Mara joined his Council of Ministers the day after the coup,
Rabuka says he 'nearly hit the roof as [he] jumped and cheered' (quoted in Dean and
Ritova 1988:78).
Rabukahadgoodreason to do so. Hehad secured the support ofunquestionably
the most influential chief in the nation. Mara was not merely Fiji's longest-serving
prime minister, to many people, say Robertson and Tamanisau, he was Fiji: 'Like
many founders ofmodern nations, Mara. . .assumed an aura oflong-held power and
a sense of indispensability ' (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:105). One senior Fiji
law officer opined that 'nobody in his right mind would organise a coup without
knowing that Mara approved and was behind it' (ibid.:94).
Did Mara help organize the coup? As with Ganilau, there appears to beno solid
evidence to that effect. But, as withGanilau, it is likely thatheknew what was afoot.
Mara was at a conference at the Fijian Hotel, far from Suva and Parliament House,
on the morning of 14 May. But he was far from out-of-touch, as Scarr observes:
If a report from deep within the Taukei Movement is true, Ratu Finau Mara
[Mara's son and a member of the Movement] had been keeping his father
informed and a message went down to the Fijian Hotel on 12 May to say the
operation hadbeen brought forward from Friday because the House was not to
sit on 15 May (Scarr 1988a:75).
Mara has indirectly admitted previous knowledge of the coup, although not to
that extent. hi an interview with Robert Keith-Reid, Mara said he heard about the
coup 'around 9 a.m\ on 14 May— an hour before it happened (Robie 1987:12).
As has been widely reported, Mara also played golf with Rabuka on 10 May.
Two Samoan visitors playing with them concluded that 'from the conversation they
had heard there was going to be a coup' (Scarr 1988a:67). These days, says Scarr,
Rabuka's enigmatic response to this is 'I think it's the most widely publicised coup
that took everybody by surprise' (quoted in ibid.).
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If, as seems likely, Mara knew what was imminent, his silence made him as
much an accessory to the coup as if he had helped plan it. Mara's duty as a
parliamentarian and a national statesman—notmerely a Fijian one—was touphold
the 1970 Constitution and the duly elected government. Even ifhe had known only
an hour beforehand, Mara should have alerted Bavadra to the danger. Bavadra
would then have had at least some chance to put a stop to Rabuka's takeover.
David Lange believes that a word to the public from Mara before the coup
'would have arrested all this'.64 Certainly, as was noted in previous chapters, Mara
failed to publiclycondemn the Taukei Movement's campaign ofdisruption. Hadhe
done so, his words would have been given great weight by most Fijians. To many
Lauans, at least, Mara is regarded as literally a demi-god. Mara's condemnation of
the Movementwouldhavebrought into question its claims ofenjoying 'wide Fijian
support' (claims later adopted by Rabuka).
Mara's behaviour throughout this period confounded some of his admirers.
Why, if he knew of the coup plans, did he let it happen? Why, if he did not, did he
lend his support after the event byjoining Rabuka's Council of Ministers the next
day? Rabuka has reported that when Mara accepted his invitation to join, and
Rabuka asked 'what about your reputation, sir?', Mara's reply was that 'his
reputation was of no use if the nation was in ruins' (Dean and Ritova 1988:78).
Scarr 's opinion is that Mara's attitude was along the lines of 'what sort ofmess will
these bloody fools make of things without me?' (Scarr 1988a:75) and that Mara is,
by nature, loathe to keep out of Fiji's politics for long.
Moreconvincingreasons, however,have already beengiven. Thecustom factor
provides many of the motives of Mara, the most influential high chief. For Robie,
Mara was behind the coup by virtue ofhis position as head of Fiji's eastern chiefly
elite. Robie also relays journalist Karen Mangnall's claims that
Mara had begun building up "Fijian institutions, particularly the military", on
the assumption they would be needed for a coup as far back as 1979 (Robie
1989:247).
Mara was, furthermore, the backbone of the Alliance, and in that role, his
political future (as well as the party's) looked uncertain. Robertson and Tamanisau
believe that after the elections, Mara lost the initiative within his own party, many
members of which blamed him for the Alliance's loss. Therefore, they argue, 'it is
probable that Mara believed that by assisting Rabuka he might regain the political
initiative'. In so doing, he could return 'in his capacity as a Fijian chief' (Robertson
and Tamanisau 1988:105).
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A further cause for concern may have been the Coalition's determination to
uncover corruption. When the Coalition won power, it inherited a system of
government saturated with friends of the Alliance, people receiving personal
benefits from the Alliance, and people who felt they owed their livelihood to the
Alliance. In its month ofgovernment, the Coalition shuffled around public servants
and replaced others, and announced its intention to weed out corruption. After
seventeen years of rule by one government it would inevitably have found it, and
many in the Fiji bureaucracy and Alliance Party would have feared discovery.65
Lawson isonewho stresses the importanceof this fear as amotivation of supporters
of the coup. Robertson and Tamanisau, too, state that ' it is probable that corruption
or the desirefor access to state resources pushedmany Alliance personnel into roles
as active collaborators' (1988:108).
Had this Coalition push succeeded, it would have done more than embarrass a
few public servants and party officials. Thereputation ofthe formerprime minister,
having presided over a government seen to be corrupt, would have been severely
damaged. It was suggested during the election campaign that Mara himself had
skeletons in his closet:
In 1985 his family invested $1 .7 million loanedfrom the FNPFand the Bank of
New Zealand into Marella [sic] House, an office complex rented to the Educa
tion Department (ibid. S5).66
The Education Department had been moved from quarters which, although
imperfect, had room for expansion; those quarters remained unoccupied after the
move. Scarr, in Mara's defence, notes that the move 'represented a saving of
$F3 1,284 on the rent of the department's existing offices', but admits 'there was
room to see conflict of interest in this', although he then calls it a 'failure of
judgement' (Scarr 1988a:46).
Scarr points out, furthermore, that anyone who 'supported the coup to avoid
exposure...seemedlikely tobedisappointedbecause anarmy inquiry [into corruption]
was in progress until, at any rate, the beginning ofDecember 1987' (ibid.A7). This
avoids the issue at hand. The army's future actions were unknown to corrupt
onlookers at the time of the coup. Faced with the likelihood of exposure by the
Coalition on the one hand, and possible escape from such exposure under the army
on the other, many would have chosen to support the coup and hope for the latter.67
Scarr does not note Rabuka's early claim that corruption allegations directed
towards Mara were an insult to a high chief and the chiefly system: 'To seemyhigh
chief being accused of corruption with no proof. . .the language used against him I
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will never accept' (quoted in Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:77). Doubtless Mara
felt similarly insulted for similar reasons. Doubtless, too, he would rather not have
faced such an inquiry, whether he was guilty or innocent.
Themost interesting interpretation ofMara's actions (and inaction) is Lal ' s . He
explains them not only in terms of Mara's Fijian role and his obvious political
interest in seeing the Coalition overthrown, but as a repeat ofhis behaviour during
previous times of crisis. In 1968, by-elections which established the NFP as 'the
only true representative of the Indian people' promised to provoke racial conflict
(Lal 1988a:41). Despite pleas from the public to calm the air, Mara chose to 'let
things take their natural course for a while' (Mara, conversation withFrankRennie,
quoted in Lal 1988a:41). When the threat of conflict began to die down, Mara
returned to the public arena 'with superb timing. . .stressing the vital importance to
independent Fiji of multi-racial development' (ibid.).
In 1982, Mara claimed that his election opponents (an NFP-Western United
Front coalition) had been provided with funds by the USSR. After sitting out the
ensuing anti-coalition uproar,Mara 'returned to thecentre stage, claimed themiddle
ground and "flew a kite" — his own words—about the need for a government of
national unity' (ibid.:42).
Mara's refusal to condemn the Taukei Movement was, then, says Lal, a repeat
of a tried-and-true tactic:
But 1987 was different. The problem did not resolve itself peacefully enough,
as it had done in 1968, for Ratu Sir Kamisese to make his accustomed
triumphantreturn as a prophet ofmulti-racialism to rescue the situation in time
(iW<*.:44).
As for Mara's motives, Lal is in no doubt:
He leaned towards goals sought by Col. Rabuka. The 1970 Constitution did not
guarantee Fijian paramountcy in perpetuity, as he thought it should have done
and had been advised to that effect by constitutional experts (ibid. :8 1 ).
In conclusion, even if the possibility that Mara previously knew of the coup is
disallowed, he (in that case rapidly) demonstrated his support forRabuka's coupby
joining his Council of Ministers. By doing so, for reasons related to customary and
possibly personal interests, Mara dramatically increased Rabuka's chances of
success, by providing his regime with legitimacy in the eyes of many Fijians, and
by denying those international and domestic forces in favour of constitutional
democracy thatsameadvantage. Therole ofMarain thecoup andsubsequentevents
was therefore a highly important one.
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The value ofthe specific interest factor
The elements of the factor of specific interest are diverse, and some are of more value
in a coup explanation than others; perhaps not surprisingly, external forces are less
important than internal forces. The importance of the personal interests of Rabuka,
Ganilau, and Mara stems from their critical role both in the events of the coup and in
ensuring its success.
Although some ofRabuka's interests derivedfromother factors ofexplanation,
the personal interests resulting from his military role had a strong influence on his
actions (which were, naturally, 'critical to the coup's success'!). The interests of
Mara and Ganilau, however, are largely derived from custom interests, and could
therefore be explained by the custom factor. The question of corruption could
possiblybe addressed in terms ofthe class factor. Still, inboth Mara's and Ganilau's
cases, someofthaipersonal traits (Ganilau's monarchist reluctance to abandon his
constitutional position entirely, and Mara's tactic of 'leaving Fiji to it' and then
stepping in to save the day) affected the course of the coup.
Specific interest, in the form I have adopted, is incapable of providing a
complete explanation for the coup. But it does deal with aspects of the coup which
cannot be easily explained in other contexts. Rather than contradicting the other
factors of explanation, then, it complements them.
O CONCLUSIONS — TRADITION AS SMOKESCREEN
Many of my conclusions about the importance of race, class, custom, and specific
interest as factors of explanation for the coup have already been made in the appropri
ate sections of this paper. In this section I give an overview of those conclusions, with
a particular focus on the 'Politics ofTradition'.
Race has undoubtedly been the most commonly offered explanation for the
coup; it so qualifies onthebasis ofcountlessnews reports alone. Among academics,
however, it hasfound lessfavour. Itsprimaryacademicchampion, Scarr,inmyview
fails to make a convincing case. Scarr's acceptance of the 'myth of cultural
homogeneity ' leads him to presume that Rabuka had the support of all Fijians —an
unspoken mandate which made his actions more a revolution than a coup. Such a
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presumption is not justified. Race does remain an important factor in the coup,
however, and helped it to succeed: it was one motive behind the coup-makers'
actions, and the rhetoric ofrace was ofgreat importance in winning tacit support for
the coup from those Fijians who were wary of Indians.
The class factor is promoted only by a minority among academics. It explains
very well the rise of those forces overthrown by the coup, without which no coup
would have occurred, and is therefore a necessary part of any coup explanation. It
is insufficient, however, to adequately explain the motives of the coup-makers.
Those motives weremorethan the protection of 'ruling class ' wealth and privilege.
Explanations involving intervention by the CIA and other external forces are
difficult to substantiate, and are supported by few academics. External intervention
also fails the test of necessity: the coup may be perfectly adequately explained
without it. In the absence of firm evidence, it will remain an explanation of
negligible importance.
The personal motives of Rabuka, Ganilau, and Mara, and the group motives of
the military and corrupt Alliance supporters, all played important roles in the coup.
Mostcanbeexplained interms ofotherfactors: military interests, for example, were
tied to those of the chiefs. Ganilau and Mara, however, were of particular impor
tance: had they strongly opposed the coup, it may well have failed. Thus their
specific interests (and of course Rabuka's) were the most necessary of any for
ensuring the coup's success.
Custom was a necessary cause of the coup; the increasing political influence of
commoner Fijians, and to a lesser degree that of the west, were ofmajor concern to
the coup-makers. More importantly, however, custom explains the coup-makers
themselves. Theforces behind the coupwere the chiefs and their supporters, largely
drawnfrom the east. The coup-makers, whonaturally werean essential cause of the
coup and its success, are themselves a product of custom. Therefore the importance
of race, class, and specific interest, which lies in their role as motives of the coup-
makers and coup supporters, is secondary to that of custom.
But is any one factor sufficient to explain the coup? The answer is no: all played
an important role. Only external intervention and corruption would probably not
havebeennecessary for the success of the coup; andof these, the latter probably did
play a part, while the former may have done. As for race, it is possible to speculate
that in a Fiji without Indians, a class challenge to customary forces could well have
been sufficient to provoke a coup; but in Fiji as it actually exists, race was
undoubtedly an important element, if not in causing the coup, then at least in
ensuring its success.
The difficulty lies in determining the relative significance of these factors. My
owndetermination is that, while almost all are necessary elements in an explanation
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of the coup, custom provides the best framework within which to incorporate those
elements. Also, even though the other factors were important, custom is the factor
most nearly sufficient in itself to explain the coups.
The growing role of 'tradition' in Pacific politics
Fiji is only one of several countries in the Pacific which have seen an increase in the
political role played by custom in the recent past. This regional trend seems to imply a
growing dissatisfaction with mere political independencefromformer colonial rulers,
and a search for a more profound independence: an independence, as far as is
practicable, from 'Western culture'.
A century of colonial rule caused or accelerated the demise of many of the
practices and beliefs of the Pacific's indigenous peoples. In their place, local
variants of well-established European practices arose, being either imposed by
colonial powers or adopted by local inhabitants. Now, in an attempt in part to build
a truly independent identity, some in the Pacific are attempting to recapture their
pre-colonial practices. While it is now impossible to bring those practices back in
their entirety — some have been forgotten, some are no longer wanted — it is
possible, they believe, to adapt existing 'Westernized' practices so that they more
strongly reflect 'indigenous traditions'.
These developments have affected many different aspects of society in the
countries ofthePacific. Someofthose aspects, such as local art and craft, havenever
been totally 'Westernized' (although it is doubtful that any have been completely
immune to changes brought on by colonization and modernization). In such cases
the process of 'recapturing indigenous traditions' is more one of revival than of
adaptation or reinvention.
One aspect of society, however, has been 'Westernized' in practically every
country ofthe region. This aspect, furthermore, affects all others anddetermines the
way these societies will develop. That aspect is politics. The entire framework of
politics in each Pacific country— with bodies of elected representatives, govern
ments drawn from those representatives, and written constitutions specifying how
these processes will work—is based on a Westernmodel (usually the Westminster
model, butinsomecases a presidential model). This is not to say thatPacific politics
is in some sense a carbon copy ofWestern politics, with every country 's parliament
a duplicate of its colonial ruler's, and every election campaign a mimicking of an
Australian or British campaign. Onthe contrary, someaspects ofPacificpolitics and
political systems are unique.68 The complicated, racially based electoral system
described in Fiji's 1970 constitution was like no other. Such examples, however
distinctive they may be, can hardly be said to reflect 'indigenous traditions'.
57
In an attempt, then, to make this dominant aspect of society more closely
conform to 'tradition', thereby clearly establishing an 'indigenous' identity for their
respective countries, elements throughout the Pacific are working to incorporate
more 'tradition' into their political systems. Post-coup Fiji provides the most
prominent examples of this process, and raises some disturbing questions.
The role of 'tradition' in Fiji is already a major political issue, and will continue
to be one throughout the 1990s. But what is meant by 'tradition' in the context of
Fiji's politics? 'Tradition' is not a term easily defined; its meanings and connota
tions are varied, and they sometimes conflict. A generally accepted everyday
definition is that a 'tradition' is a belief or practice which has been handed down
from generation to generation. This implies to most people that traditions have
remained unchanged for as long as can be remembered. In the Pacific context, to
speak of something as a 'tradition' further implies that it derives from pre-colonial
(or pre-European contact) beliefs or practices. The umbrella terms 'tradition' and
'traditional' collect these individual traditions into a single whole, a unique 'belief-
system' or 'way of doing things' which has the weight of history and experience
behind it.
For some years historians and anthropologists have questioned this simplistic
view of tradition. A considerable body of literature has emerged in the last decade
on the subject of the 'invention of tradition', some of it focussing on the Pacific
experience.0 Central to all ofthis work is theobservation thatmany 'traditions' (and
hence much of 'tradition') in any one society had their beginnings not in the mists
of long-forgotten eras but rather during recent history. Many examples have been
given of 'traditions' which originated in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries.
According to the generally accepted definition given above, then, such 'traditions'
would seem not to be traditions at all.
The 'invention of tradition' argument seems at fust to reduce the value of the
label of 'tradition'. How, itmay be asked, can any practicebe traditional, in the sense
that it is linked to the distant past, if it can be shown to have been invented a
significantly changed at some stage in the last 100 or 200 years? Furthermore, why
is it important to some in the Pacific that invented elements of systems of
government and other aspects of the political process be seen as genuinely
'traditional'?
The latterquestion is akeyone in any discussionof 'tradition inPacific politics ' ,
one only beginning to be considered by political scientists and others. For most
people (in the Pacific as elsewhere) the issue of 'invented traditions' is unfamiliar,
if not unknown. Questions about the 'inauthenticity ' of traditions do not occur to
those who are not aware that their 'traditions ' may be invented. Mostpeople believe
the generally accepted definition given above: that is, that anything labelled a
'tradition' is longstanding and not of recent origin.
,
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The label 'traditional' can actually afford new practices a large measure of
protection from subsequent questioning and attack. A new generation, not having
known a time when a certain practice did not exist, and having been told only that
that practice is 'traditional', may treat that practice as if it were traditional — that
is, a genuinely time-honoured practice—even if it was invented only a generation
before. So labelled, the invented practice acquires an exalted status not enjoyed by
its competitors; it has an advantage against any suggested replacement, in that it is
now the 'tried and true' alternative.
There is, I would suggest, commonsense in favouring the 'tried and true'; there
is commonsense in following a thoroughly tested path which has been found
adequate by previous generations, in the same way as employers prefer job
applicants withrelevantwork-experienceto applicants without.This 'commonsense'
explanation may also explain the certain degree of comfort that many people gain
from traditions — that is, from continuing to do things as they have been done for
many generations. In the Pacific, a similar explanation may also apply to the
emphasis given to the indigenous nature of local traditions; traditions are seen to
comefrom pre-colonial ancestors rather thanfrom colonial outsiders, andhence are
seen as being more inharmony with the local people, having been developed under
and for local conditions.
The concept of the 'invention of tradition', although gaining prominence upon
the release in 1983 of Hobsbawm's and Ranger's collection of the same name, has
been discussed by Pacific scholars for some time — in particular those concerned
with Fiji. Peter France's pioneering work The Charter ofthe Land (1969) focussed
attention on the invented character of many 'traditional' institutions in Fiji. Fiji is
in fact a key example, often discussed in this context: here was a colony with a
prominentnineteenth-century governor, Sir ArthurGordon, who actually wished to
preserve Fijian traditions and Fijian ownership of land. In 1 876, Gordon convened
the first 'Great Council of Chiefs' to ascertain customary land rights, inventing a
prominent Fijian political tradition in the process: no such body had existed in the
divided and war-torn country beforehand. The chiefs so brought together actually
disagreed about the nature of customary rights; this confusion was only resolved
when Gordon threatened that, unless a decision were made, Fijians' land would be
given to Europeans. The chiefs suddenly reached agreement, and so from an
invented Council of Chiefs acting under duress came the invented tradition of the
mataqali as the land-owning unit (Rutz 1987:537-38).
Fijian 'tradition' was also subject to what Martha Kaplan has termed 'the
invention of disorder' (Kaplan 1989:359). Some genuinely indigenous practices
were actively suppressed by the Fijians' new colonial masters. Fijian practices and
institutions 'had to show social utility in relation to colonial goals and purposes' to
qualify as 'traditional' in British eyes; those that did not were categorized as59
superstitious, heathen, or criminal. In the extraordinary example of luve ni wai
rituals (not understood by the British, and therefore seen as subversive) these newly
proclaimed 'disorderly' practices were also claimed to be unacceptable to Fijians
themselves (ibid. :352) . The suppression ofluve ni waiwas therefore notmerely the
suppression of a tradition, but the invention of a negative tradition.
Not all invented traditionhas been the resultofcolonial dictates. RogerKeesing,
in his important article 'Creating the past: custom and identity in the contemporary
Pacific' (Keesing 1989), has criticized aspects of the reinvention of tradition by
Pacific peoples themselves. In 'what purports to be [the] study and revival of
cultural traditions', says Keesing, Pacific peoples, particularly Fourth World
minorities, 'idealize and mythicize the cultural past as a Golden Age' and 'edit out
human sacrifice, chiefly oppression, bloody wars [and] patriarchy' (Keesing
1991:169). This process of idealizing and editing, says Keesing, is prompted by
Westernvalues ofright and wrong, and draws on 'Western-derived countercultural
critiques'. Keesing's criticism of this process of ideology-construction—perhaps
his main one — is that 'such ideologies become self-delusory if they are not
interspersedwithvisions of"real"pasts that cast intoreliefnot simply theiridealized
virtues, but their cracks of contradictions' (Keesing 1989:36).
Lately, some anthropologists have attacked the notion that invented traditions
are somehow 'false' or Unauthentic'; in this context Keesing's remarks about
'spurious pasts andfalse histories ' havebeen criticized (see Linnekin 1 99 1 : 1 75) . In
the words of Nicholas Thomas (1992:), 'assumptions have clearly become more
sophisticated...it is now emphasized that created identities are not somehow
contrived and insincere'. Some anthropologists are attempting to exorcize what
Margaret Jolly has termed 'the spectre of inauthenticity' (Jolly 1992). In part this
stems from anthropologists' recognition of their discipline's limits: the 'real' pasts
of Pacific peoples can only ever be imperfectly uncovered. 'Invented' tradition is
therefore being seen as a focus of anthropological study as important as 'real'
tradition, and change in tradition is being accepted as an inevitable (and desirable?)
aspect of Pacific life.
While this new strand to the literature is to be welcomed, and its arguments
appear valid in the more general context of Pacific societies and cultures, it has the
potential to set back the study of the growing role of tradition in Pacific politics. In
effect it limits criticism which might be made of present-day 'traditional' political
institutions, disallowing any criticism that is based on the 'inauthentic' nature ofthe
traditions underpinning thoseinstitutions. Insodoing itundermines anyexamination
of those institutions' political legitimacy, legitimacy which may derive to a
significant degree from their 'traditional' nature.
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The implication of the 'exorcism of the spectre of inauthenticity ' argument in
the Fiji coup debate is that the invented nature of Fijian traditions is not legitimate
ground for criticism of today's 'traditional' politics. In the political context,
however, I believe that the task ofexposing inauthenticity remains a valuable one.
Inpolitical systems, problems arisewhen invented ' traditional ' political institutions
— such as the Great Council of Chiefs, or the pre-eminence of Eastern chiefs over
all Fiji — are portrayed as authentic, because they gain a large measure of their
legitimacyfrom thatfalse authenticity. As previously noted, this false authenticity
can actually afford such institutions much protection from attack, particularly in a
community, such as the indigenous Fijian community, which values tradition
highly. In effect, these inauthentic traditions are conferred an unfair advantageover
alternative arrangements, and 'traditional' figures, such as chiefs, gain a similarly
unfair advantage over their commoner rivals.
Those standing to benefit politically from 'inauthentic' traditional political
institutions (mainly chiefs) may be as unaware of that inauthenticity as are most
other members of their society. But this should not imply that, as there is no intent
to deceive, the hunt for inauthenticity should be called off. If the basis of chiefly
political legitimacy is questionable, mis should be made known, for there is much
at stake: political institutions have the potential to affect every aspect of people's
lives, andnotnecessarily for the better, as many aspects ofpost-coup life in Fiji have
shown.
Discussions of 'invented traditions' in politics can encounter a cool reception
from some quarters. In some cases— and Fiji is probably one—customary rulers
will not wish to know about the inauthenticity of their institutions, and an intent to
deceive may then emerge. In such cases the task of exposing inauthenticity is an
even more valuable one. But why, in such cases, do we see an attempt to portray
'invented traditions' as 'authentically traditional' in the first place, when in other
aspects of society and cultural life invented traditions may be perfectly acceptable
and even inevitable?
One explanationmay be that to accept that a 'traditional ' political institution is
invented is to accept change, the very antithesis of 'authentic' tradition. If a tradi
tional institution is shown to havebeen invented, it loses some of its 'tried and true'
reputation, and demonstrates to 'tradition'-minded locals that 'traditional' political
institutions are notnecessarilyrooted in the distantpast, and neednot be. Customary
leaders whose forebears may have sanctioned radical change (as occurred in Fiji)
canhardly then argue that a similar degreeofchangetodaywouldviolate 'tradition'.
In Fiji, such a set ofcircumstances wouldhave left traditionalists with littledefence
against (for example) LabourParty proposals to make the distribution ofrents from
Fijian-owned lands more equitable.
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The question then to be asked is, ' who controls the process ofmaking political
institutions more traditional?' Moves towards an expansion of the role played by
tradition in Pacific systems of government have not always proved to be in the
interests of those they are claimed to benefit — that is, the bulk of an indigenous
population. An expansion of the role of 'tradition' in Fiji has meant the strength
ening of a customary elite. Furthermore, under the guise of 'tradition', basic
concepts and rights adopted during or after colonial rule, such as freedom of
expression or equal representation, have been replaced with restrictive rules which
conflict with Western values. These rules have served to reinforce hierarchy and
restrict opportunities for voicing dissent in a manner which has directly benefitted
the customary elite.
Rhetorical references to 'tradition', the term carrying with it a wide range of
deep implications for any Pacific audience, serve well the current regime. 'Tradi
tion', when promoted as an expression of indigenous values and independence,
serves as a smokescreen to disguise moves by Fiji's customary elite towards
entrenching itself in power. Nobody really knows what level of Fijian support the
post-coup regime commands. Even if, however, it has the support of a majority of
Fijians, it is doubtful that that majority is fully aware of the implications of the
regime's policies for the rights and values it has come to expect. The smokescreen
oftraditionhas cloudedoversuchquestions. Thelegitimacy ofthepost-coupregime
as being representative of the Fijian people is therefore questionable.
The military-backed government seems to have shared doubts about its level of
Fijian support, which Lal suggests is why it refused to put the constitution to a
referendum and why an election was not held for some years; the government
wanted no visible demonstration of any lack of support among those Fijians whose
interests it was supposedly defending ('Dateline', SBS Television, 10 November
1990).
Buteven ifFijians wereunited in their supportfor chiefly rule, another question
remains: why should the Indian half of the population be expected to subject itself
to another culture's idea of a 'traditional political system'? Itmay be acceptable for
culturally homogeneous nations such as Tonga to adopt electoral systems biased
toward customary groups.70 Fiji, however, is no longer culturally homogeneous.
When studying the political events of Fiji, which to date have been dominated
by British colonialists and Fijian chiefs, it is easy to overlook the Indians, and even,
as do Rabuka and some others, to dismiss them as 'immigrants' who shouldn't
expectto wieldreal power. ButtheseIndians arenowadays all native toFiji. Thepast
generations chose Fiji over India,71 but the newer generations have known no other
country than Fiji. Most could not afford to leave, and most would not want to leave.
That they choose to stay in Fiji, however, does notmean that Indians should accept
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an infringementoftheir basic rights; each Indian has as muchofa right to participate
in the determination of the country's political system as does each Fijian.
A political system which can only satisfy Fijians is therefore unsatisfactory.
Some form ofcompromise is needed. The 1970 constitution's form of democracy,
with racial voting, over-representation ofEuropeans, and a Fijian-dominated upper
house, was one such compromise.
The disappointment caused by the coup, both locally and internationally, was
therefore well founded. The compromise so essential for Fiji had already been
found. It was that very compromise which was overturned and replaced with a
system satisfactory only to an unknown fraction ofone elementofFiji's racial mix.
Richard Mulgan, in an article entitled 'Should indigenous peoples have special
rights?', reaches a more general set of conclusions, but they apply here:
Of course, the position of the descendants of precolonial peoples can be
improved on. . . . But this should not be done in the name of special political
rights for indigenous peoples as such. . . .Some compensation for past wrongs
may be necessary and desirable, but it is the present and future that count, and
the guiding principles for the present and future must be justice and equality for
all citizens (Mulgan 1989:388).
To argue for a compromise political system is not to deny that the Fijian people
could be better represented in Fiji's economy, nor that it is important to maintain
Fijian culture. Given that Fijians' culture is unique, while Fiji Indians' culture is a
modified form of that existing in India, there is, arguably, a greater need to bolster
the former against subsumption. Butunquestioned and unchecked rule by a chiefly
oligarchy was notapart ofpost-independenceFijian culture, despite thepersistence
ofchiefly interests below the political surface. As Tupeni Babahas said, ' the current
constitution takes theFijianpeoplebackwardsmorethan ahundredyears ' (speaking
on 'Dateline: power play in paradise', SBS Television, 10 November 1990).
The ordinary people of Fiji, of all races, believed by 1987 that democracy was
well established in Fiji. Lawson has argued that this was always a false assumption,
and events seem to support her argument. But that this beliefwas widespread surely
indicates that the potential existed for democracy to become well established— at
least to thepointwhereacoupcouldnothaveoverthrown it so completely in amatter
of weeks or days. As Robie says:
Christianity was introduced to Fiji only 15O years ago; now it is a deeply
embedded part ofFijian culture. Can it seriously be suggested that democracy
cannot be a part of it as well? (Robie 1989:286)
Unfortunately, the forces for democracy in Fiji now face a difficult task.
Possibly their most profound setback came in November 1989 when Timoci
Bavadra lost his fight with cancer; estimates of the number attending his funeral at
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Viseisei ranged from 20,000 to 50,000 (Islands Business, December 1989). The
provisions of the 1990 constitution have made any outright election win by Labour
and/or the NFP impossible. Fiji's opposition forces have splintered, and their
chances of gaining any political power of real significance seem slim.
Fiji's foreseeable future will therefore be dominated by the chiefs and the
military. The continuing role of the latter in Fiji's politics seems assured. The
RFMF's numbers have swelled from 2,000 in 1987 to 5,000 today, and its budget
allocation for the 1990/91 financial year was F$38 million (compared to a health
care allocation of F$29 million). Furthermore, the military, as Sanday notes, has
become increasingly politicized since the coup: the level of officer-training in non-
military skills (such as law and political science) has increased, for example, and
fourformer AllianceMPshavebeen granted commissionedrank (Sanday 1989:15).
Rabuka, ofcourse, remains prominent in post-coup politics. After two years of
pressure from Mara to choose between the army and politics, Rabuka finally
responded by opting for the latter. He left the army in August 1991, and became
ministerforHome Affairs andco-deputypiim&xmmster(seeSydneyMorning Herald,
17 August 1991); at the time of going to press he has, through some clever factional
manouvreing, emerged victorious from the first elections held under the 1990
constitution as Fiji's new prime minister. He had already declared his desire to be
prime minister in August 1990, at that time saying his goal was to
fulfil my objectives andmy promises of 1987. My objective was the firming up
of the Fijians as the true owners of this country.. .. My promise was to look
after the guests, the non-Fijians (Pacific Islands Monthly, August 1990:11).
The 'firmingup' ofthe 'trueowners'—thechiefs—has alreadybeen achieved.
With the 'guests' now defeated, thereby removing a source of concern shared by
many Fijians, divisions within the Fijian community will be exacerbated. Conflict
between commoners and chiefs, however, will probably not become obvious to the
public, given the biases of the electoral system, and given that laws are made
possible by the 1990 constitution which prohibit any attacks on the 'reputation, the
dignity and the esteem' of the chiefs.
More obvious will be a resurgence oftribal rivalries, as the three confederacies
(and a possible fourth) vie for power and influence. Robie has described one case
of tribal rivalry which has already occurred:
On 22 January 1988, three spear and club-wielding Taukeists raided the Suva
offices of Radio Fiji in an abortive coup attempt which failed to gain the
support which had been expected....The crude plot...involved a scheme to
kidnap President Ganilau and replace him with. . .Ratu Sir George Cakobau
(Robie 1989:248).
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Theplot was an attempt to 'restore the social order representedby . . .the head of
the Kubuna', Cakobau (ibid.:285). Cakobau's potential as a 'rallying point for
widespread opposition to the Tovata ascendancy' was also noted by Norton:
Ratu George, supportedby several other Tailevu chiefs, voiced his displeasure
with the regime of Mara, Ganilau, and Rabuka (all of Tovata) by boycotting a
meeting ofthe Council of Chiefs (Norton 1990:148).
Cakobau's death in November 1989 has, for the present, lessened any threat to
theTovatachiefs,butchallengesfromother areas arelikely to arisenow that the only
arena in which significant political change may be achieved is the chiefly system.
Custom not only provides the best framework for explaining the coup; it also
provides the model forFiji's politics in the 1990s andbeyond. Fiji'spolitical system
will thus make a fascinating subject for study by political scientists, and the
literatureofthe coup will undoubtedlybejoinedby a largebodyofliterature dealing
with Fiji's politics after the coup. Unfortunately, for the majority of Fiji's people,
Fijians and Indians alike, subservience to an oligarchy of chiefs may prove less a
source of fascination than a source of frustration.
Notes
1 Members ofthe army were (and are) predominantly indigenous Fijians. Less than 3 per cent of the
RFMF were Indians at the time ofthe coup (West 1988: 223).
2Ratu is the Fijian chiefly title for men ofrank; its equivalent for women isAdi.
3 A particular observer's explanation will not necessarily fall solely under one factor heading. The
predominance ofa particular factor within an explanation may determine under which heading it best
belongs; but where necessary I have discussed different aspects of an explanation under different
factor headings.
* Taukei is the term for a member of a village land-owning clan, but in pre-coup usage had come to
mean*indigenous Fijian'. Since the coup it has gained various political connotations as a result of its
use by theTaukei Movement.
5 Further discussion about the nature ofpre-coup 'democracy' in Fiji, and some of its failings, can be
found in Lawson (1988b:35-47). (Lawson in no way endorses the idea that Fiji democracy's failings
somehowjustified its overthrow.)
6Notable exceptions were David Robie, a freelancejournalist in the Pacific, and Marian Wilkinson, of
theABC's 'Four Corners' programme.
7 A likely interpretation of this apparent paradox is that Rabuka was concerned about the damaging
consequences ofthis unrest not for the Coalition, but only for anti-Coalition Fijians. In this case, he
would have seen himselfas enacting the Taukei Movement's wishes, but in a more efficient manner.
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This rationale would be consistent with such statements as 'I see how these events could lead to
serious situations and threaten law and order and property' (Rabuka, quoted inRobie 1989: 221).
8 Dean is an Australianjournalistand Ritova a Fijian photo-journalist.
9 Stephanie Lawson lectures in Politics at the University ofNew England. In this paper I have referred
to her many articles and papers on the subject, which are noted individually. Her book on the coup,
The Failure ofDemocratic Politics in Fiji, has since been published (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1991).
10 RobertRobertson is an historian at the University ofthe South Pacific, and Fijian Akosita Tamanisau
is ajournalist who worked for the Fiji Sun before the coup.
11 First, 'tradition' embraces more aspects of a society's culture than its politics, and secondly,
'traditional', in the context ofthe Pacific, is often taken (rightly or wrongly) to mean 'pre-European
contact'. The labels 'custom' and 'customary' carry fewer such connotations, and allow for the
evolution of 'traditional' structures through the colonial and post-colonial periods. Compare, for
example, these definitions drawn from The MacquarieDictionary (1981):
tradition, n. 1. the handing downofstatements, beliefs, legends, customs, etc., from generation
to generation, esp. by word ofmouth or by practice.
custom, n. 3. a long-continued habit which is so established that it has the force oflaw. 4. such
habits collectively.
customary, adj. 2. of or established by custom rather than law. 3. Law. defined by long-
continued practices.
It must be acknowledged that the distinction between these terms is a fine one (and where others have
used the term 'traditional' I have not taken issue with them). The quasi-legal dimension to the term
'custom', however, makes it useful in a political discussion. I also wish to avoid the 'pre-contact'
connotations of 'traditional' as far as is possible. Fijians themselves, few of whom have a detailed
knowledge ofFiji's pre-colorrial history (which regrettably is not taught in most schools), are apt to
consider the village practices with which they have grown up as being 'traditional', even though
these practices may in fact have developed within the last one or two generations.
12 Senior lecturer in Anthropology and Comparative Sociology in the School ofBehavioural Science at
Macquarie University.
13 Primarily, these are Eddie Dean and Stan Ritova, Brij Lai, Stephanie Lawson, Robert Norton, Robert
Robertson and Akosita Tamanisau, David Robie, and Deryck Scarr. But also discussed to some
extent are the views of Kenneth Bain, Michael Danby, Don Dunstan, Christopher Harder, Ralph
Premdas, TheoRoy, William Tagupa, Nicholas Thomas, Anthony van Fossen, and Owen Wilkes.
14 Fiji's economy has largely recovered (thanks to tax-free zones which act as incentives for overseas
investors), although it is doubtful whether ordinary Fiji citizens are seeing the benefits of this
recovery. The Fiji dollar has been devalued more than 30 per cent since the coup, and market prices
have inflated by over 30 per cent in the same period. "The government's economic revival', says
reporterRon Harel, 'is a mirage. Most profits are going offshore' (Ron Harel, 'Dateline: PowerPlay
in Paradise', SBS Television, 10 November 1990).
15 Percentages from North (1987:22). Total from 'Muslims in Crossfire', Pacific Islands Monthly,
September 1987, p.24. These commonlyquoted figures are not census results; rather, they were
drawn from an interim population survey conducted in 1986.
16 Specifically, by Rabuka himself. See Dean and Ritova (1988:126).
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17 When the value ofthis land is examined, however, a different picture emerges. Less than 10 per cent
ofFijians ' land is cultivable, and mostofthe highest-valueprime commercial freehold land is owned
by Europeans (Premdas 1990: 12).
18 Lai (1988a:49) notes mat by 1986 38.9 percent of Fijians lived in urban areas.
19 The explanations he notes are intervention by the CIA, the manipulation of Rabuka by powerful
individuals, and a 'boundless ambition' on Rabuka's part.
20 It is ironical that one of those leaders, ApisaiTora, had, until 1982 when hejoined the Alliance, been
a member of parliament for the predominantly Indian National Federation Party (Pacific Islands
Monthly November 1987, p.15. See also Norton 1977:129).
21 The '6 per cent oftotal voting strength' point stressed by Scarr overlooks this. Scarr implies that the
30 per cent of Fijians who failed to vote would, if they had voted, have voted for the Alliance in
similar proportions to those who turned out. This cannot be asserted with certainty given their
decision to abstain from voting.
22 Kenneth Bain has served as an administrator in colonial Fiji, and as a director at the Commonwealth
Secretariat. His book. Treason at Ten (1989) is a personalized account of the coup.
23 Under the 1970 constitution, there were 52 seats in (he (lower) House of Representatives. Twenty-
seven were communal, filled by candidates of the appropriate race who were elected by voters of the
same race. Ofthese seats, 12 were Fijian, 12 Indian, and 3 General (Le. other races). Theremaining
25 seats were 'national'. Ofthese, lOwere Fijian, 10 Indian, and 5 General, and they were filled by
candidates of those races. Voting for national seats, however, was based on a common roll.
Therefore, if the Indian vote for a national seat was outnumbered by the Fijian vote (with General
electors usually voting with Fijians), the candidate (ofwhateverrace) favoured by Fijians would win.
(The Alliance won many national seats this way; its Indian national MHRs were often elected by
Fijian votes.) Under a first-past-the-post system, though, a split in one community's vote had a
similar effect. Thus, a split in the Fijian vote led to the NFP election win in 1977 and the Coalition
win in 1987 (although a precise explanation is somewhat more complicated). (This note on Fiji's
electoral system is basedon North 1987:22.)
24 The government could have gradually changed the composition of the Supreme Court in its favour,
but would have done so at the risk ofencountering considerable public hostility.
25 It should not automatically be assumed that because Kahan is an Indian, his sympathies lie with the
Coalition. His first name, Mohammed, indicates that he is a Muslim. Fiji's Muslim community has
not distanced itself from Rabuka's regime as completely as other Indians have. The Fiji Muslim
League took advantage of the post-coup constitutional review process to lobby for separate repre
sentation for Muslims, a long-sought goal (although not achieved in this instance).
26 Harderwasoneof several lawyers who helped preventKahan's extradition from London to Fiji His
book, TheGunsofLautoka (1988) is partly an autobiography andpartly a description ofhis personal
experiences in post-coup Fiji.
27These allegations are mainly drawn from Kahan's own written account, which is reproduced in full
in Harder (1988:214-17). A summary of this account (with sics omitted for the sakeof brevity) fol
lows:
Mara's initial deal with Colonel Rabuka was that Rabuka hand back power within 30 days from
the bloodless coup to Marat... [But Rabuka] started to enjoy the fame and feel ofreal power He
demanded active participation in any new government . . . Rabuka's nagging fear was that ... he
could be dispensed ofif he gave up real power. .. .
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The question that worried Mara was that the longer Colonel Rabuka stays in effective control of
power and learns from Mara, Ram Mara will become dispensable. And it would be harder for Mara
to get rid of Rabuka.. ..We heard that Mara was a very worried man [and] pot out feelers and
floated an insurance policy plan for Mara.. ..He signalled that he can help divide the Army to
weaken Rabuka but he needed Indian assistance to obtain arms for this divided Army....
Rabuka suspected Mara and he strengthened his secret alliances...Taukei started to openly
criticise Mara and demanded him removed on the grounds of corruption, etc. The stage was being
set for Rabuka's third coup which was planned for April 1988 ... We quickly signalled to Mara...
now [Rabuka] was sure that his inner circle had holes.. . .
The question is, of course, how much credence does one give to Kahan's words? But then, why
believe Rabuka's or Man's version of events, if both may have a vested interest, for different
reasons, in keeping the true story quiet? At the very least, Kahan's story demonstrates that the
explanation for the arms shipments could quite possibly be more complicated than Scan allows.
28 An indication of how far Fijian attitudes had come is given by a survey undertaken by A. C.Cato in
the mid-1950s, when the Indian population, as a proportion of all people in Fiji, was at its peak. In
many discussions with people of both races, Cato found mat 63 per cent of Fijians expressed
complete rejection of Indians and desired that none should remain in Fiji, and a further 25 per cent
were opposed to Indians but willing to let them remain under conditions clearly favourable to Fijians.
Furthermore, in 64 conversations with Fijians concerning the possibility of Fijians sharing power
with Indians in an independent Fiji, 54 ruled it out completely (Cato 1955: 17-19). There is no doubt
that Fijians were far more tolerant of Indians by the 1980s, and it seems quite reasonable to expect
mis trend to have continued had the coup not occurred.
29 The terms of the coalition agreement were largely dictated by Labour (Robertson and Tamanisau
1989212).
30 This deficiency has been addressed in more depth by William Sutherland, in his review ofPower
andPrejudice inTheJournal ofCommonwealth andComparative Politics 28 (March 1990): 133.
31 Mention should be made here of a new work available at the time of going to press: William
Sutherland'sSeyon^/Ac Politics ofRace: AnAlternative History ofFiji to 1992 (1992). Sutherland,
to a degree not previously seen in similar projects, examines Fiji's history in class terms, making
important and original points in the process. His class analysis of Fiji is more clearly argued and
presented than those in the older works discussed in this chapter. As an explanation of the coup,
however, (admittedly not the book's focus), his analysis contains some of the weaknesses pointed
out here. Sutherland, in seeking to draw out the continuities in Fiji's class history, pays the events of
May 1987 themselves relatively little attention. Theresulting impression given is that the coup was
largely a result of economic forces; and, as is the case to varying degrees in other works mentioned
here, the traditional/chiefly aspects of Fiji's ruling class are less completely explained than the:
economic elements. Overall, however, Sutherland's book has much to recommend it, and his
detailed chapter on post-coup developments (to May 1992) gives an insightful commentary on often
confusing events.
32 The historical information which follows is based largely on a reading of two sources: Routledge
(1985) and Campbell (1989).
33The colonial administration did, however, attempt to minimize the effect on Fijian land ownership of
deals between chiefs and unscrupulous white settlers. A Lands Commission was set up which
-
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reviewed all pie-Cession claims and returned about halfofthe area claimed by Europeans to Fijian
ownership (Lawson 1987c:6).
54 Routledge describes the extent of this intermarriage in today's Fiji. Mara is 'heir to the Fijian
paramount line in the Lau Islands and the Tongan line established by Ma'afu'; both he and his wife,
Adi Lady Lala, are 'direct descendants of the first Cakobau, as are also Ratu Sir George Cakobau,
present Vunivalu of Ban and former Governor-General, and Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau... present
Governor-General' (Routledge 1985: 220).
•5 Once the eventual independence ofFiji was seen as inevitable (given the world's changing political
climate), the colonial government carefully groomed a number of chiefs to assume the mantle of
power. Even the political system adopted, however, may not have totally satisfied the eastern chiefly
elite. Lal has observed: 'when Ratu George Cakobau asked that Fiji be returned to Fijians, he meant,
without a shadow ofa doubt, Fijian chiefs. In fact, he himselfalong with Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, E
Vito Qiolevu and others reportedly petitioned die Queen in 1969 to do precisely that' (Lal 1988a:64).
36 Lawson has noted that the paradoxesofFiji's land system go back to the earliest days of the colony:
' So complex and various were existing land tenure practices that it was not until 19 18 that the Native
Lands Commission finally agreed to the designation of the mataqali as the unit through which
ownership would be vested' (Lawson 1988a:7). By the 1940s, 'the practical universalization of the
mataqali hadbeen enforced so effectively by dieadministration that younger Fijians had inadequate
concepts of their own genuinely traditional divisions' {ibia\: 8).
37 The concentration of economic activity in the west (and the resulting need for access by foreign
companies to land) may also have served to aggravate western commoners' grievances against their
chiefs, as the following 1978 quotation from a Fijian sociologist demonstrates:
In the Western division we see many partnerships between leading chiefs and overseas compa
nies. This is primarily because the chiefs aren't allowed to sell land, so the easy way for an
overseas company to acquire land is through partnership with a chief, who usually becomesricher
as a result. (Bolabola 1978: 156).
Thus, commoner grievances, which as noted earlier are seen throughout Fiji, are probably particu
larly evident in the west.
■ 8 Sakeasi Butadroka is, on first examination, a perplexing character. He has been widely quoted as
saying, on the day of the coup, 'Where is Kamisese Mara? Don't blame Bavadra, don't blame
anybody, blame Kamisese Mara who sold Fiji.. . .Mara, the bloody Judas Iscariot!' (Robertson and
Tamanisau 1988: 70). This was interpreted by some journalists at the time as evidence of Fijian
outrage at Rabuka's action. Yet Butadroka came out in support of the coup, telling his party in July
that 'All that I've been fighting for in the past seventeen years Rabuka has now won for Fijians'
(Scarr 1988a:90). He was also, as previously mentioned, the one who moved in Parliament in 1977
that all Indians be expelled from Fiji Butadroka has himself said, however, that 'telling Indians to
get out of Fiji was just a political tactic to stir Fijian feelings and so force Ratu Mara to do something
about the poverty in Fijian settlements here' (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:47). He is consistently
pro-Fijian commoners in his behaviour, and quite wary of chiefs. He has criticized post-coup
developments which strengthen chiefly power for that reason, his FNP going so far as to call for the
abolition ofthe chiefly system altogether (Lawson 1990:16). His outburston 14 May 1987 has been
amply explained by Scarr: Butadroka 'was attacking his aversion, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, for
creating die 1970 Constitution, which made the coup necessary, in Butadroka's terms, by failing to
hand the country back to the Fijians' (Scarr 1988a:90).
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39 This remade is especially perplexing when one notes that it was made by an Australian: Australia's
states have very few linguistic and cultural differences, yet they vigorously pursue (and perpetuate)
their separate interests.
40 Here it is particularly relevant to recall the earlier-noted degree of intermarriage between chiefly
families throughout Fiji (particularly post-Cession), which resembles that of the royal families of
nineteenth century Europe. A western chiefmay in fact be more closely related to eastern chiefs than
to his own subjects.
4 1 The main reason for this move seems to be an agreement between the three existing confederacies
that the presidency of the Republic will circulate between their paramount chiefs every five years.
Among western chiefs mere has been 'a strong feeling that the proposal would further marginalize
the western traditional leadership' (Thomas 1990:137). Although the move for a fourth confederacy
is a chiefly one, the Coalition has expressed support for the concept, as it would represent a more
equitable distribution ofpower than exists atpresent (Sharma 1989: 18).
42 The west is at present split between Kubuna and Burebasaga. Tovata is a wholly eastern confed
eracy. The east/west divide does not, however, represent a divide between Tovata on the east and
Kubuna and Burebasaga on the west: the latter confederacies are both politically dominated by the
east coast of Viti Levu, and their paramount chiefs are easterners. Hence the move by some western
chiefs for a wholly western confederacy.
43 jo again use the Australian states analogy, the parochial Tasmanian 'norm-south divide' does not
prevent a common interest from prevailing when Tasmania is dealing with the Commonwealth
governmentor competing with mainland states.
44 The village was Viseisei, IS kilometres from Nadi airport on the west coast of Viti Levu (Bain
1989:115).
45 Titles such as 'Tui' and 'Vunivalu' (which translates as 'warlord') are reserved for the highestchiefs
in the hierarchical chiefly system. For example, the Tui Cakau, Ratu Ganilau, and the Tui Nayau,
Ratu Mara, are bomparamount chiefs of their regions.
46 Ganilau once asserted mat the Vunivalu ofBau would be obeyed everywhere in Fiji without question
(Keith-Reid 1982:16).
47This was reported by Taniela Veitata, who did not identify the chiefconcerned (cited in ibid.: 139).
Veitata was the Alliance MP who appeared in the description of the coup given in the Introduction.
48 That Scan presents information useful in a custom framework, and then interprets it in a racial
manner, must be attributed to a belief in what Lawson calls the 'Myth of Cultural Homogeneity',
which is that all Fijians have identical interests. My discussion of this myth has been implicit
throughout sections 2-4.
49The Council ofChiefs was and is the highest ofthe Fijian community's deliberative bodies. But even
it is not 'traditional' but 'customary': it had not existed before Cession, but 'apparently arose almost
by accident when, at Gordon's installation as "supreme chief of Fiji, he had used the occasion to
consultwith theRokos (chiefs appointed as governors) who had assembled there from all over Fiji'
(Lawson, 1987c:3).
50 During the early stages of the review process, the Constitutional Review Committee, 'weighted in
favour of the Taukei Movement,...did not bother to breakdown the [800 written and 161 verbal
submissions] or even to take note of majority support for the old constitution among Fijian
submissions. Instead it focused entirely on the lastsubmission, that from the chiefs' (Robertson and
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Tamanisau 1988:132). Its repeat of21 August 1987 endorsed all of the chiefs' proposals except for
the 'consensus' system ofelection (ibid.). Since Rabuka's second intervention, 'discussions regard
ing constitutional changes have taken place under a non-elected government without public
consultation' (Prasad 1988:114).
51 Former South Australian premier Don Dunstan was bom in Fiji and is chairperson of the Fiji
IndependentNews Service.
52 The Great Council of Chiefs, prior to the coup, consisted of all 22 Fijian members of the (lower)
House ofRepresentatives, IS members (8 chiefs and 7 others) appointed by the Minister for Fijian
Affairs, and 2 or 3 representatives chosen by each of Fiji's 14 provincial councils. (These councils
are Fijian bodies. The 14 provinces were set up by the colonial administration last century, andrange
widely in Fijian population from 4,462 in Namosi to 55,343 in Ba. The smaller councils are staunch
supporters ofthepost-coup regime.) Since the coup the MHRs have been excluded from the Council
of Chiefs. The Council determined on 9 June 1990 that in future it will consist of42 members chosen
by the provincial councils (i.e., three each) and a dozen drawn from and nominated by the govern
ment (Dunstan 1990).
• 3The remaining senator is chosen by the Council ofRotuma. Rotuma is a tiny Polynesian dependency
ofFiji.
54 Thepre-coup electoral system is discussed in section 2 ofthis paper.
55 This is an important point which has not featured to date in many analyses of the 1990 Constitution.
Section 41(2) ofGovernment of the Republic of Fiji, Constitution ofthe SovereignDemocraticRe
public ofFiji (1990), states that:
For the purpose of electing the members of the House, voters shall be registered on one offour separate
rolls, that is to say -
(a) a roll ofvoters who are Fijians;
(b) a roll ofvoters who are Indians;
(c) a roll ofvoters who are Rotumans; and
(d) a roll of voters who are neither Rjians, Indians nor Rotumans.
Seats are assigned to each roll as previously noted. An important distinction between the 1970 and
1990 constitutions is that 'Fijians' are no longer defined as all Fijians, but rather, as all Fijians
'registered or eligible to be registered in the Vola ni Kawa Bula' (Section 156[a]). Those Fijians
remaining will therefore go onto the fourthroll (see also Pacific Islands Monthly August 1990, p.13).
56 See an earlier footnote for an explanation of why Scarr presents this custom information in a racial
framework.
57 The leasing system has produced a similarresult. Van Fossen notes that ' the Fijian Administration
leases land to Indians only for short periods, on die understanding that it will eventually revert to
supporting die traditional [chiefly] conception of rural life'. But that same policy is destroying
Fijians' land: 'Since Indians. . .have little incentive to develop the land under these conditions, there
is severe erosion and poor conservation' (Van Fossen 198721).
-8 Owen Wilkes is a member of the Peace Movement Aotearoa. His article, 'U.S. Involvement in the
Fiji Coup', appeared inPeacelink and Wellington PacificReport.
59This suspension was not, however, complete: the American Peace Corps programme continued, as
did funding ofsome otherprojects (Howard 1990: 18).
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^Premdas's discussion of internal factors is probably best categorized as racial. While Premdas does
point to the likely role played by important Alliance figures, and does demonstrate that many Fijian
fears were unfounded, he seems largely to accept the 'myth of cultural homogeneity', and stresses
the clash ofFijians and Indians somewhat more than class or custom. Hediscusses many conflicting
explanations, however, and is not as readily pigeonholed as Scarr, Roy, orWest.
61 Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Sanday was second-in-command of the RFMF at the time of the coup. He
now resides in Australia.
62 Fijian soldiers stationed on UN peace-keeping duty in the Middle East seem to have been less
strongly socialized in Alliance and chiefly values; over half of them voted for the Coalition in the
election (Dean and Ritova 1988:34).
63 Robie, however, relays 'persistent stories' that several officers opposed the coup, and says 'some
soldiers were reportedly detained because of their refusal to follow Rabuka's leadership' (1989:229).
64 See chapter 4 for a discussion of the second intervention, and Ganilau's and Mara's roles.
65 Cameron's letter (not actually published by The Bulletin until after the second intervention) is
reproduced in Robie (1989:243-44).
^Theopinion ofNew Zealand's ex prime minister is reported in Robertson and Tamanisau (1988:94).
67 Allegedly corrupt Alliance members included Apisai Tora (see Saffu, 1989:16) and Peter Stinson
(Jim Anthony, speaking onJudy Fasher, "Tuesday Despatch: The Fiji Military Coup', ABC Radio,
19 May 1987, transcript, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia,
p.10). Tora was an ex-minister, a leader of the Taukei Movement, and later minister in the Republic.
Stinson, also an ex-minister, stood prominently next to Rabuka at the first post-coup press confer
ence (Alley 1987:491), and joined Rabuka's IS May Council of Ministers (Robertson and
Tamanisau 1988:71).
68 The correct spelling is 'Marela'.
69 It is also interesting to note that the army's corruption inquiry preceded a Taukei Movement
campaign for theremoval ofMara on corruption grounds. Rabukaallegedly instigated this campaign
to put pressure on Mara as part of a power struggle between the two. (See Mohammed Kahan's
allegations in section 2, this paper.)
70 Fora discussion ofdistinctive aspects ofPacific political systems, see Fry (1983).
71 A starting point in this literature is Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983). Other key discussions are
Babadzan (1988); Keesing (1989); Lirmelrin andPoyer (1990); Jolly (1992); Thomas (forthcoming) .
72 One reason why I have used the term 'custom' through most of this paper is to avoid the ambiguity
surrounding the term 'tradition' (see section 1).
73 Such systems do leave parts of society under- or unrepresented; but viewed from a Lockean 'social
contract' perspective, they may have validity. The society may be considered to have developed as if,
at some stage, its people had unanimously agreed to adopt the system favoured by the majority, that
majority then choosing a custom-style system. This view does overlook the phenomenon of such
systems being forcibly adapted by, or incorporated into liberal democratic systems by, colonial
powers. But even in these cases, a demonstration by a society of support for its new hybrid system
(for example, through a referendum at independence) can, from a Lockean perspective, bestow
validity upon it.
74 Despite the indentured labour system, they did choose to stay at the end of their indenture.
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